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IN THIS ISSUE . . .

. . . **W. Stanford Reid** studies the relationship of the Christian and the world as developed in the writings of John Calvin. A graduate of McGill University, Montreal, he received Th.B. and Th.M. degrees from Westminster Theological Seminary, Philadelphia, then the Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania before returning to McGill in 1941. He is now Associate Professor of History.

Publications include *Church of Scotland in Lower Canada* (1936), *The Economic History of Great Britain* (1954), *Problems in Western Intellectual History Since 1500* (1954), and numerous articles; Calvin and the Continental and Scottish Reformation generally are fields of special interest.

Professor Reid is also a minister of the Presbyterian Church in Canada.

. . . A Christian approach to anthropology is suggested by **H. Wade Seaford, Jr.**, of the Biomechanics Laboratory, Tufts University. Mr. Seaford is presently working on a human engineering project for the Air Force. He has taught at Brownsville (Texas) Junior College and held a teaching fellowship and assistantship respectively at Harvard University and Tufts University. He has completed the residence requirements for a Ph.D. in anthropology at Harvard.

A graduate of Nyack Missionary College and Wheaton College, Mr. Seaford directed the Christian and Missionary Alliance Mission in Mexico City, and studied at the Escuela Nacional Antropología e Historia from 1948 to 1951. He also did ethnographic field work among the Chocho Indians at Oaxaca, Mexico.

. . . A series of two articles by **Thomas H. Leith** on radiocarbon dating is concluded. Professor Leith, formerly a teaching fellow in geophysics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, is now Assistant Professor of Science and Mathematics and Head of the Division at Gordon College. He is preparing a Ph.D. thesis at Boston University on "The Idea of Time and the Geological Sciences." (See further "Personalia," Vol. I, No. 1, February, 1955, p. 30.)

Among our reviewers . . . **Lloyd F. Dean** heads the Department of Philosophy at Gordon College; **Charles A. Huttar** the Department of English Language and Literature. **Roger Nicole** is Professor of Theology at Gordon Divinity School. **Daniel B. Stevick**, a graduate of Wheaton College, is Vicar of All Saints Episcopal Church, Fallsington, Pennsylvania.

Ralph E. Hone, who formerly taught at Gordon College, is now Associate Professor of English at the University of Redlands. **Ann D. Ferguson** is Instructor in English and Fine Arts, **Donald F. Tweedie** is Assistant Professor of Psychology, and **Thomas Grady Spires** is Instructor in Philosophy, all at Gordon College.

Paul King Jewett is Associate Professor of Systematic and Historical Theology at Fuller Theological Seminary. **Philip C. Johnson** is Professor of Bible at Gordon College. **Charles Davis**, an honors graduate of Gordon College, is now Byington Fellow and candidate for the B.D. degree at Gordon Divinity School.

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THE CHRISTIAN IN THE WORLD

A Facet of Calvin's Thought

W. Stanford Reid

One of the ever present problems of the Christian in this life is that of living "in the world." He is, it is true "in, but not of the world," yet to say this poses rather than solves the problem. What does it mean to be "in, but not of the world"? How far should the Christian's "pilgrim" state influence the way he lives? This is a practical matter which the Christian has to face, but which often, because he has no adequate understanding of his true position, brings him only confusion and uncertainty.

Christians down through the ages have endeavoured to reach a conclusion concerning this abiding difficulty, but not infrequently, they have felt strongly the influence of non-Christian philosophies and points of view. In general, however, one might say that within the Church the tendency has usually been in one of three directions. On the one hand, there have been "the libertines" whose answer has been that since the world is really nothing, the Christian may do just as he pleases. On the other hand, there have been "the ascetics" who, declaring that the world is entirely evil, have forbidden the Christian to have any contact with it beyond what is absolutely necessary. Those who have attempted to take an intermediate position in this debate have usually found themselves unpopular with both sides. That there are such differences, however, reveals clearly that the matter cannot be ignored as unimportant or solved by a "few well-chosen words."

During the Middle Ages these three points of view were all held, but there is little doubt that asceticism was regarded as being the best way. The "religious man" was he who bound himself to the monastic life by irrevocable vows of poverty, celibacy and obedience. Yet not infrequently this asceticism led to only more thoroughgoing worldliness, which in turn exercised an evil influence upon both the "secular" clergy and the people at large. During and after the Protestant Reformation the same problem posed itself in the newly organized churches. What should be the Christian's attitude to life in the world? Although many different ideas were presented, probably among the most influential were those of John Calvin of Geneva, who attempted to give some guidance to his followers, by basing his teachings on a careful study of the Scriptures.

In his final edition of his *Institutes of the Christian Religion* Calvin stated his views in a number of chapters in the third book. At no one point, however, did he make a full and systematic statement of his "doctrine of the world." Therefore, it would seem to be of some value to put together what he had to say on the subject both in his commentaries and in the

Institutes in order to see the full sweep of his thought. In so doing one may be able to grasp what one of the greatest Christian thinkers has to say concerning this rather thorny problem of the believer's relations with "the world."

Not infrequently Calvin has been misrepresented and his words twisted, but when one attempts to understand his views, one cannot but be impressed with his profound understanding of the faith, coupled with his very realistic approach to the world in which the Christian must live. Although it will be impossible to make a full, detailed study of his views in this article, if one follows what Wencelius has called the "rhythm" of his thought, "creation, fall and redemption,"[1] one may obtain an adequate understanding of his teaching and from it derive no little help for living in the twentieth century.

The World as Created

Fundamental to Calvin's understanding of the Christian's life in this world, as to all his thinking, is his belief in the divine sovereignty. God is the world's creator who not only made it out of nothing, but sustains it at all times. Moreover, creation as it came from the divine hand was perfect, for the holy God could not make anything which was ultimately faulty, and it is basically this creation which still exists. Indeed "were it not that his continued inspiration gives vigour to the world, everything that lives would immediately decay or be reduced to nothing" (Jno. 1:1-6; cf. Heb. 11:3).[2] It is God's universe, therefore, with which the Christian must deal when he lives "in the world."

Because of his doctrine of creation and providence, Calvin rejected every Manichean dualistic interpretation of the universe. There was and is no ultimate evil over against God's perfection. Man when originally placed in God's world was, therefore, to rejoice in it, for it revealed fully the divine perfections, being "no doubt made, that it might be the theater of the divine glory" (Heb. 11:3). This revelation appeared first of all in the beauties of nature and of man, himself, the handiwork of God.[3] But equally important, God provided in His creation for all of man's physical needs, and that not sparingly but bountifully in order that he "should have nothing wanting to a sweet and pleasant life" (Gen. 1: 30; 2: 2). Thus God manifested in creation through His glorious splendour, His goodness, wisdom and grace, that man might ever rejoice in Him.[4]

1. L. Wencelius, *L'Esthetique de Calvin* (Paris, n.d.), p. 14.
2. Where references are made to Calvin's commentaries, the Bible verse will be cited directly in the text. Where references are to other sources, footnotes will be used.
3. Wencelius, pp. 25-40.
4. *Institutes,* tr. J. Allen, 6th Amer. ed. (Philadelphia), Bk. I, Chap. xiv, 20; III, ix, 3; J. Bohatec, *Bude und Calvin* (Vienna, 1950), p. 264.

Man's capacity to rejoice in God was itself a blessing, for it revealed that he, like the rest of creation, was the work of God's hands. What is more, since man was conscious of his duty to rejoice in the Creator, this in itself was a demonstration of the fact that he was the highest point in the terrestrial creation. He was to be the spectator of "the fabric of the world," for he alone had been created in the image of God.[5]

This immediately brings up the question of what Calvin meant by "the image of God." Although he acknowledged that the human body was most beautifully and intricately made, he denied that the image of God was to be found in its physical glories. Rather he believed the divine likeness to consist in man's true knowledge, righteousness and holiness, coupled with dominion over the rest of the creatures. "In the mind perfected intelligence flourished and reigned, uprightness attended as its companion, and all the senses were moulded for due obedience to reason; and in the body there was a suitable correspondence with this internal order" (Gen. 1:26; cf. Jno. 1:9). Man was thus completely fitted to serve and glorify God upon earth, for he knew God as God and himself as God's creature.

How was man to glorify God? Primarily by acknowledging that all he possessed he had received from the divine bounty, for which he gave thanks and was obedient. These God-given possessions were of two kinds. The first was, to Calvin, the gift of all that nature provided for man's sustenance and livelihood. Indeed, even in our fallen state "nature itself exhorts us to give thanks to the Lord for having introduced us to the light of life, for granting us the use of it, and giving us all these helps necessary to its preservation."[6] The other class of gifts consisted of those bestowed upon man in order that he might fulfill his responsibilities in this life, for all capacities, Calvin held, are blessings bestowed by God (Exod. 31:2). Endowed with such great benefits, man had every reason to glorify God.

It might be well to pause for a moment at this point to examine a little more closely the second class of God's gifts to man. They were first of all social graces which God granted to the race in order that man might establish political and economic systems upon the earth. God did not ordain that he should live in anarchy, but under government, so he equipped some individuals for the work of ruling their fellows.[7] Likewise, he also furnished some with talents to guide economic matters, for man was to obtain his livelihood from the world in which he lived. Man's original natural condition therefore was not one of emptiness, for although he de-

5. Wencelius, pp. 28, 37.
6. *Institutes,* III, ix, 3.
7. *Institutes,* III, xix, 14; P. A. Diepenhorst, *Calvijn en de Economie* (Wageningen, 1904), pp. 306f.

veloped many of these gifts only after the Fall, he possessed them, at least in embryo, from the time of his appearance upon earth.

God, however, did not limit his gifts to matters affecting social relationships, but included also all cultural and artistic endowments. Calvin never tired of pointing out that all of these were man's through the gracious activity of the Holy Spirit (Exod. 31:2; I Cor. 1:17). Rhetoric, for instance, one of the oldest arts, God gave to man that he might employ it to set forth the divine glory.[8] And all the other arts he bestowed upon man for the same purpose.

Thus the world, as created by God, was in Calvin's eyes good, for it was the work of the master craftsman, who had equipped it to enable man to live the fullest possible life, to the glory of God (Gen. 4:18). It is true that the Scriptures do not state specifically that these talents were conferred upon man in his original creation, but Calvin implies that they were already his, since even after the fall he manifested great God-given powers. If he had remained righteous, he would have developed his gifts still more rapidly and fully.

The World as Fallen

It was the advent of sin which changed everything. Calvin did not believe that sin was inherent in the universe. He was very emphatic that the Roman Catholic idea of sin coming from the physical or natural passions was wrong, since this implied that sin was something metaphysical. Sin was not a result of a defect in God's plan nor was it a weakness in the world's elements, but was the outcome of man's own decision. The whole man, a unity of body and soul as a person, took himself from under the sovereignty of God and placed himself under the rule of Satan (Gal. 1:4; Eph. 2:2f.). Thus man's rebellion could not but bring upon him God's condemnation and wrath (Eph. 2:3).[9]

The outcome of God's judgment against the sinner was death, both spiritual and physical. As Calvin pointed out when expounding Ephesians 2:1, man as a result of the Fall is not *half* dead but *wholly* dead, owing to his trespasses and sins (cf. Jno. 5:25). And the evidence of man's spiritual state is that "the whole soul, fascinated by carnal allurements, seeks its felicity on earth."[10] Thus man, by renouncing the sovereign rule of God, has wilfully blinded himself to the divine power and glory, setting himself and the world up as ultimate (I Cor. 7:29ff.). This could not but lead to error and confusion of mind, for the unbelieving creature no longer regards anything in its true light, since he refuses to see all things as the

8. *Institutes,* III, x, 2; Bohatec, pp. 258-263; Wencelius, pp. 98ff.
9. Cf. *Institutes,* I, xv, 1; Wencelius, p. 37f.
10. *Institutes,* III, ix, 1f.

result of the power and goodness of God (Rom. 1:21). Consequently God who is truth must reject the rebel who has denied Him.[11]

Concomitant with God's rejection of man has been God's curse upon nature as part of the divinely imposed penalty of sin. This applied not merely to man's own physical being which through sin is bound under death, but to the physical being of the earth and all its inhabitants (Gen. 3:19). Calvin holds that a good many of the noxious things which one finds on the earth today are the results of man's revolt. Moreover, the natural tendency of all things to preservation and perfection has been changed and corrupted so that disintegration and evanescence has become nature's dominant characteristic (Gen. 2:2; Rom. 8:19f.). At the same time, Calvin insists that man, by his very sinfulness, has also played a part in the defacement of nature. He points out that the sinner has destroyed many of God's blessings by his lust and greed so that it may not be long before nature will be unable to support him on the earth (Gen. 3:18). Thus the whole world has been involved in the cataclysm of sin.[12]

It is sin's corruption of both man and nature that has led to the perversion of human culture. Man has clung so tenaciously to the passing world that he has been unable to raise his eyes to God.[13] True, he may talk of God in awed terms, but he never takes him really seriously, for he places his faith in chance or fortune (Heb. 11:3). Even when he attempts to establish a system of ethics he is never able to "rise above the natural dignity of man.[14] Moreover, he goes so far as to set up earthly objectives as ultimate and to seek them with all his heart only for the purposes of over-indulgence and sin (Rom. 14:13). The artist and rhetorician employ their gifts to enhance their own reputations, while the rich endeavour to increase their wealth only to lord it over their fellows (I Cor. 1:17; I Tim. 6:17). It is no wonder that man, under these circumstances, cannot attain unaided to a knowledge of God. "Man," says Calvin, "with all his acuteness, is as stupid for obtaining of himself a knowledge of the mysteries of God, as an ass is unqualified for understanding musical harmonies. . . . A knowledge of the sciences is mere smoke where the heavenly science of Christ is wanting" (I Cor. 1:20; 2:7).[15]

Because of the effect of sin on man, one might expect that it would

11. *Institutes,* II, i.
12. *Loc. cit.* One may not agree with Calvin that the Bible teaches us that there was no disintegration or perhaps death before sin entered, but there is little doubt that he is right in his contention, if we believe that everything was moving towards perfection, until sin arrested the process by bringing God's curse upon the world. Cf. E. L. Mascall, *Christian Theology and Natural Science* (London, 1956), pp. 299f.
13. Bohatec, pp. 264ff.
14. *Institutes,* III, vi, 3.
15. Cf. *Institutes,* II, ii, 18.

have completely destroyed him. And indeed, in principle it has "since out of Christ we are altogether dead, because sin, the cause of death reigns in us" (Eph. 2:1; cf. Jno. 1:5). Logically, therefore, culture, science and even man himself should have quickly perished from the earth; and they would have, had it not been for the restraining grace of God.[16] By His Spirit he has prevented sin from utterly destroying the image of God in man, so that he continues to possess within himself a seed of religion and a consciousness of the difference between good and evil (Jno. 1:5, 9). Moreover, God has continually bestowed upon fallen man many physical, intellectual and cultural gifts, as is indicated by the fact that "the liberal arts and sciences have descended to us from the heathen" (Gen. 4:20ff.). These the Spirit gives to individuals in order that they may use them for the amelioration of the evil conditions of this life (Exod. 31:2; I Cor. 1:7; 4:7). True, they usually pervert, misuse and abuse God's goodness, but all these things are still God's gifts through which man *should* see the donor (Jno. 1:10f.; I Cor. 1:20).[17]

The World Redeemed

The divine grace which gives man these gifts, however, is not "saving" grace. "Some kind of life, I acknowledge, does remain in us while we are still at a distance from Christ," says Calvin, "for unbelief does not altogether destroy the soul. But what has this to do with the Kingdom of God?" The answer is, nothing (Eph. 2:1). The "natural man" thoroughly endowed with mundane gifts cannot by reason or science attain to a knowledge of God, nor does he wish to for he has no faith. What he needs is the regenerative work of the Holy Spirit by which he will become "a new creature." It was to obtain for His elect this new birth that Christ bore the penalty of their sin, bringing them out of this "world" into the Kingdom of God (Gal. 1:4; 6:14; Jno. 1:12, 13; Rom. 12:12).[18]

It is important to keep in mind at this point, however, that Calvin never thought of regeneration or renewal as something physical, but rather as spiritual, restoring to man "true knowledge, righteousness and holiness" (II Tim. 2:11f.).[19] God having opened the elect's minds through the Spirit and having enlightened them by the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, they then "see sparks of his glory, as it were, glittering in every created thing" (Heb. 11:3). But equally important, since faith is part of the new birth (Jno. 1:13), the regenerate man, rejoicing in the knowledge of God's goodness, sees his highest end to be the fulfillment of the will of God and the manifestation of His glory. This is the true

16. *Institutes,* II, ii, 3; Wencelius, p. 15.
17. *Institutes,* I, xv, 4; II, ii, 12; III, vii, 6.
18. Cf. *Institutes,* II, ii, 18ff.;II, iii.
19. Cf. *Institutes,* I, xv, 4; III, vii, 3.

wisdom, not that which is based primarily upon the world, for "the world in its wisdom knows not God" (I Cor. 2:6; Rom. 12: 12). Rather it is the wisdom which by faith persuades man to seek union in holiness with God so that he "carries about Christ living and reigning within him."[20]

Such unity with Christ in holiness cannot but result in the regenerate man's delighting himself in the Law of the Lord. Henceforth he will not live unto himself, but unto God who has loved him and redeemed him in Christ Jesus (II Cor. 5: 14). Here is the central core of Calvin's concept of Christian ethics. The Law of God, no longer to the Christian a means of salvation, has become on the other hand a guide to the holy will of God for His people. Moreover, the Law has been manifested in concrete form in Christ, the Christian's great example. Thus the man who is a Christian finds that the Law of God, from which he has been redeemed, and which was concretely manifested in Christ's life on earth, contains the principles to guide his life, and so to determine his attitude to the present world.[21]

While for many Christians of our own day such views as these can lead only to some form of asceticism, in Calvin's thought such a conclusion would be entirely wrong. He held that the Christian was neither to maltreat the flesh nor to indulge it according to the dictates of human reason. He must "not generate either hatred of life, nor ingratitude towards God," nor must he long for death, since life "is a post at which the Lord has placed us, to be retained by us till he calls us away."[22] Rather, the Christian is to follow the teaching of the Scriptures, attempting to imitate Christ as far as possible. As a regenerate man, the Christian should deny himself, placing no trust in the flesh or the world, but as Adam should have done, he should endeavour to serve Christ diligently, using temperately his gifts in creation, to the glory of God (Lk. 16: 8).[23]

The Christian's Use of the World

How did Calvin believe this principle should be applied? To answer this one must realize, of course, that he believed that anything which is contrary to God's revealed will, the Law, is sinful and by the Christian must be eschewed. He held, at the same time, however, that the Christian must see that the world and all it contains, although under God's judgment, still is good and given for the Christian's use (I Tim. 4: 4). "All things that are connected with the enjoyment of the present life are sacred gifts of God," and our attitude to them must be dictated by this fact.[24] It is man's misuse

20. *Institutes,* III, vi, 1ff.; III, vii, 1ff.
21. *Institutes,* II, viii, 1ff.
22. *Institutes,* III, ix, 3-4.
23. W. Niesel, *The Theology of Calvin,* tr. H. Knight (London, 1956), pp. 99, 141ff., 151.
24. Bohatec, p. 264; Wencelius, p. 15.

and abuse of them which is sinful. Therefore the Christian in his use of these gifts must be careful that he never regards them as absolutely his own and becomes obsessed with them (I Cor. 7: 29ff.; Matt. 13: 22), nor should he attempt in his self-love to exalt himself over his fellows who have not received the same blessings.[25] The Christian is to use the world's goods in all humility, as God's steward (Phil. 2: 3f.).

In order to fulfill this responsibility, the Christian must grasp the fact that God has called all men to work. Moreover, he should understand that because this is God's ordinance, it imposes upon him the duty of carrying out his obligations as faithfully as possible. In exegeting Luke 16: 10ff. concerning the "Unjust Steward" Calvin pointed out that those who, in dealing with the riches of this world, are unfaithful, should not be entrusted with the inestimable treasure of the Gospel "for they who are bad stewards of earthly blessings, would not be faithful guardians of spiritual gifts." All lawful employments, therefore, but particularly offices of government, are to be accepted as trusts from God. Moreover, if one is successful and becomes wealthy or famous, he is to realize that he has received this advancement by the grace of God alone, and consequently it should redound to His glory.[26] "Worldly" activity, in this way, becomes an integral part of the ordained pattern of the Christian's life.

While many Christians both in Calvin's and in our own day would agree with his thesis thus far, the Reformer would take one more step. In his opinion, not only does the Christian have to fulfill his obligations in life, but it is also his privilege to use God's material and intellectual gifts freely, for both the blessings of nature as well as the capacities and achievements of men, are all created for the Christian's comfort and well-being. A practical example of his application of this view is to be found in his organization of the Genevan Academy. He insisted that a basic knowledge of the classical languages and humane science was needed for the adequate study of theology. Moreover, when Theodore Beza came to Geneva, in order that the students should learn how to speak well and to reason logically, his first assignment was a course of lectures on the Orations of Demosthenes and on some of Aristotle's works.[27] Calvin felt that even men who were planning to enter the ministry should have a thorough and practical knowledge of God's gifts to the heathen. It was purely a matter of practical expediency whether one employed them, since of themselves

25. *Institutes,* III, vii, 4-7.
26. *Institutes,* III, x, 3f.; xix, 14; Diepenhorst, pp. 306f.
27. B. J. Kidd, *Documents Illustrative of the Continental Reformation* (Oxford, 1911), p. 594; P. F. Geisendorf, *Theodore de Beze* (Geneva, 1949), pp. 85ff.; cf. W. S. Reid, "Calvin and the Founding of the Academy of Geneva," *Westminster Theological Journal,* XVIII (1955), pp. 1-33.

they were without any moral bias (I Cor. 1: 17; 7: 29). He sums his whole attitude up in these words:

> We are bound by no obligation before God respecting external things, which in themselves are indifferent; but that we may indifferently sometimes use and at other times omit them. . . . Ivory and gold and riches of all kinds, are certainly blessings of Divine Providence, not only permitted, but expressly designed for the use of men; nor were we anywhere prohibited to laugh, or to be satiated with food, nor to annex new possessions to those already enjoyed by ourselves or by our ancestors, or to be delighted with musical harmony, or to drink wine.

Therefore, the Christian is to use such things "to the same end for which the Creator himself has created and appointed them for us."[28]

To Calvin it is of the utmost importance for the Christian to have this firmly embedded in his mind, for if he does not he will be quickly ensnared in an "inextricable labyrinth from which it is afterwards difficult to escape."[29] Too many Christians, believing that "things" which are God's gifts are in themselves evil, go to extremes in their "scrupulosity," adopting a legalism entirely out of keeping with the Gospel. Hence Calvin, contrary to the opinion of many who have charged him with being an ascetic, always insists that the Christian is free to use all that God has bestowed upon him.[30]

Does this mean then, one may ask, that Calvin teaches that Christians may become licentious and self-indulgent? By no means. Although he insists that God's mundane gifts are of themselves morally indifferent, he is equally certain that the Christian cannot be indifferent to their use. If a Christian treats the world and its goods improperly, the outcome cannot but be sinful. Primarily it is a question of one's attitude. In all things Christ must have the pre-eminence, since He is Lord of all. Consequently in all the Christian's actions, in the totality of his life, he must place Christ first, doing His will and seeking to manifest His glory. Only then will he, even in the use of things indifferent, be able to act in love to the Lord his God, and to his fellowman. Calvin refuses to accept any approach to the problem which is mechanical, stressing instead that one's understanding and solution of it must be primarily in the context of Christian faith and love (Rom. 14: 14f.; I Cor. 7: 29; 10: 19ff.; Phil. 3: 8).

In explaining what he meant by this, Calvin maintained that first and foremost, the love of God must permeate all of the Christian's life. If it does, the things of this world will assuredly be given an entirely subordinate position in the Christian's hierarchy of values, and he will sit very loosely to the material blessings which he has received. As Calvin put it, to be a

28. *Institutes,* III, xix, 7 and 9; x, 2.
29. *Institutes,* III, xix, 7, and the whole chapter.
30. *Institutes,* III, vii, 1.

Christian, one does not have to be poor, but if one is, one must be prepared to accept poverty as part of God's purpose for him (Phil. 3: 8; 4: 11f.). It is one aspect of the educative process through which he must go in order to advance in sanctification. Thus the Christian is to use the world to obtain a greater knowledge of God, which in turn will remove all intemperance from his desires. "He will always regard the Lord, to be conducted by his direction, to whatsoever lot He has provided. . . ."[31]

Calvin has sometimes been accused of teaching that worldly prosperity is a sign of God's favour and of the individual's election. Such an idea, however, is very far from the truth. Repeatedly he points out that God's judgment on sin results in misery and trouble even in the Christian's life, although the extent of this misery varies from person to person, according to God's sovereign wisdom. Therefore, the Christian may well experience poverty, disease, loss of loved ones and even persecution, which is part of bearing the cross for Christ. The effect upon one so afflicted will doubtless be fear and sorrow, for Calvin denied the Stoic doctrine that man should be unmoved by troubles (Heb. 2: 4; II Tim. 4: 10; Matt. 19: 29).[32] Yet in all his troubles in this world, the Christian must realize that they are sent by God in order that he may grow and become strong. Such trials are not the result of blind chance, but are according to God's sovereign determination, that the Christian's faith and love may grow stronger (Gen. 3: 18). When the Christian realizes this, he will begin to have a true "contempt" for the world, in that he will more fully appreciate the world's transitory and indifferent character as compared to the glory of the eternal and sovereign God (Phil. 4: 11).[33]

There is, however, another facet or side to this matter of the Christian's attitude to the things of this life. True understanding and love of God as the Supreme Good, affects the Christian's attitude to his fellow man. For one thing, the Christian must realize that he is responsible for his fellows, and all that he has he is to use for their benefit. Nor is it sufficient for him to employ his possessions in a mechanical or unfeeling manner, for he is to be truly sympathetic, putting himself in the position of the less fortunate. This is true even when they may have unjustly persecuted and attacked him. His natural tendency in such circumstances is to exalt himself, minimizing his own faults while magnifying those of his opponents and even of his friends. The proper Christian attitude, however, is always to see in others the image of God, defaced though it may be, and to recognize their gifts. "For it would betray great wickedness in us to rob

31. *Institutes,* III, vii, 8.
32. *Institutes,* III, vii, 9 and 11.
33. *Institues,* III, vii, 10f.; viii, 2; ix, 1f.; x, 3f.; Niesel, pp. 142f.

them of that honor which God has given them." Thus Calvin's view of creation, common grace and Christian love all coalesce at this point, so that "the result of attention to these directions will be, that with whomsoever we are concerned, we shall conduct ourselves not only with moderation and good humour, but with civility and friendship."[34]

The Christian's life in the world, however, involves him in dealings not only with men in general, but more particularly with his fellow Christians. This lays upon him an extra responsibility, for not only should he conduct his life and treat his brethren with "civility and friendship," but by virtue of his love for his fellow Christian, he should make sure that his actions do not "grieve" his brother. Christian freedom is always to be subject to our fellow Christian's profit as well as our own (I Cor. 10: 19ff.; Rom. 14: 14f.). This means that it is always necessary for every Christian to refrain from using his liberty if he has good reason to believe that by some indifferent act, he would instigate a brother to do that which is contrary to what he believes to be right. As he pointed out when expounding I Corinthians 8, this is the fundamental principle behind Paul's instructions concerning the eating of meats offered to idols. Christians must be governed by love for the brethren in their use of the world (I Cor. 6: 12, 13).

At the same time, Calvin, never losing sight of the Christian's freedom, does not hold that it is always in the best interests of some Christians to curtail one's liberty. It may be that those offended by some morally indifferent act, are not really weaker brethren, but Christians who are pharisaical and legalistic. If such be the case, Christian liberty to use things indifferent must be vindicated "if it be endangered in weak consciences by the iniquitous requisitions of false apostles."[35] Likewise he insists that Christians do not need to scruple in all circumstances about this use of their liberty "whether there may be an occasion of offence in what we do, except when the danger is present to our view" (I Cor. 8: 13; I Tim. 6: 17). Thus he emphasizes repeatedly that the Christian's liberty is not an abstraction, but is a concrete gift of God to be used, always with due consideration for the brethren, as He intended.[36]

Moderation

From what has been said, it is clear that Calvin did not regard this matter of the Christian's relations to the world as a simple matter. Rather it is terribly complex, so that the Christian must walk circumspectly keeping the Lord his God and his neighbor always in view. If one were to use a

34. *Institutes,* III, vii, 4-5ff.; viii, 2f.
35. *Institutes,* III, xix, 11 and 12.
36. *Institutes,* III, xix, 8.

single word to characterize the Christian's use of the world it would be "moderation." Yet even the employment of this term does not immediately shed enough light. In order truly to love God and man as he should, the Christian must set aside all earthly things. This is the one thing which is conducive to moderation.

At first one may feel that by such a requirement, Calvin virtually pushes the Christian back into asceticism. Yet he is not quite so absolute as he at first appears, for while he strongly stresses the importance of a Christian indulging himself as little as possible, retrenching all superfluities and restraining luxury lest he pervert the gifts of God into hindrance, he at the same time points out that the Christian's expenditures on ornaments and personal beautification are not necessarily evil, and what is more, they may help others economically (Gen. 3: 21; Lk. 16: 9).[37] That which he must guard against is thinking and acting as though this world is of ultimate importance and that he need look no further for his ultimate bliss. If he keeps his eyes upon that which is higher, how he uses the world will take care of itself.

What is this higher view of things which helps the Christian to be moderate? It is the expectation of Christ's return and the establishment of His eternal Kingdom (Eph. 1: 21). The Kingdom, it is true, said Calvin, has already been set up but only in its final glorious revelation on the day of judgment and in the revelation of "the sons of God" will the believer find true bliss and peace (Lk. 18: 30; Rom. 8: 19f.). It is for this that the Christian must continually look, and in so doing he will always receive encouragement and confidence for his weariness, along with an antidote for the seductive appeal of the "vanities of this world" (Lk. 16: 8; Tit. 2: 13). This is the ultimate guide which shows us the true meaning and the true importance of the present "age."

As one thinks back over Calvin's view of what should be the Christian's attitude to the world, one cannot but be impressed with two things. It is soundly theological, while at the same time eminently practical. Laying his foundations securely on the doctrines of creation, fall and redemption, he continually reminds the Christian that though he lives in a sin-cursed world, it is still God's world, possessing many tokens of God's infinite grace. Therefore, it is not to be despised. Rather, as a redeemed son of God, the Christian is to use it always in love to God and to his fellow man, in the expectation of eternal life. This spells moderation. Thus the Christian life, in Calvin's view, is closely bound up with the Christian faith.

At the same time, Calvin is eminently practical. Some may object

37. *Institutes,* III, xix, 9; x, 1 and 4.

that he seems to contradict himself at times, he does not lay down any rigid rules, nor does he condemn anything but that which is condemned by Scripture. In this, however, Calvin is practical and realistic. He knows only too well that in dealing with things indifferent, circumstances alter cases. The Christian is responsible individually to apply the law of love and moderation to each individual question. Neither church nor state can properly interfere, for the Christian is God's freeman, responsible to use all God's gifts to His sovereign glory and honor.

THE PLACE OF ANTHROPOLOGY IN THE CHRISTIAN *WELTANSCHAUUNG*

H. Wade Seaford, Jr.

1. *Definition and scope of anthropology*

Little more than a decade after a former theological student had stirred scientific and philosophical circles with his *Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection,* another English scholar, E. B. Tylor, concerned not with biology, but with customs in different parts of the world, systematized a large mass of disparate data and became the "father of modern ethnology."[1] Tylor addressed one of his works, *Anthropology* (New York, 1920), to "the student who seeks to understand how mankind came to be as they are, and to live as they do. . . ." This, the goal of anthropology. While the physical anthropologist perspires with the perplexities of how Homo sapiens "came to be," social and cultural anthropologists — not to be outdone in the least — take on all the rest, or why these creatures "live as they do."

Physical Anthropology. In studying man from a physical point of view, the anthropologist makes use of a wide assortment of seemingly unrelated data: genes and geological strata, skulls and statistics, molars and monkeys. Whereas he finds plenty to measure and test on nicely articulated skeletons covered with muscles and skin, an untidy heap of bones in some dingy cave might afford him equal inspiration. His, the quest of understanding the course and mode of biological change resuting in the appearance of man on this earth, perhaps some thousand millennia ago.

Social anthropology. Although the anatomy and physiology of this perspicacious Primate, Homo sapiens, regrettably leave it no alternative for being more than another animal, it is, nevertheless, a sociable one. Like gibbons, chimpanzees and various other higher Primates, man is

1. Ethnology pertains to the comparative study of different cultures; sometimes it is synonymous with both social and cultural anthropology.

a social animal.[2] To unravel the intracacies of human society, the anthropologist is sometimes obliged to lay down his shovel and calipers, while donning shirt and necktie to confer with the more civilized sociologist who thinks in terms of juvenile delinquency, reforms, and how TV is affecting American society. At times, the anthropologist, with his natural science background, finds the philosophically and psychologically colored sociological jargon mildly tedious; nevertheless, he is aware of an interest in total man, and he accordingly draws liberally from sociological data.

On his own hook, the anthropologist has investigated the social structure of many different peoples. In each society around the world, he wants to know the type of family to be found — whether the basic familial group consists of a married man and woman with their offspring, or whether there are various men married to one woman, or various women married to one man. The manner in which different peoples refer to their cousins enables him to classify types of kinship systems. When we refer to "cousin," for example, it could be anyone from our parent's sibling's child to a tenuously related person out on the farm. An inhabitant from the middle of Africa, however, would find our system grossly inadequate and deplorably unsophisticated. When referring to a female "cousin," he is careful to determine whether she is a father's sister's daughter or a mother's brother's daughter. Furthermore, a father's brother's daughter and mother's sister's daughter are designated in yet another fashion.

By classifying various kinship systems, the anthropologist is able to make assumptions about their developmental course, as well as to anticipate other social phenomena resulting from the function of any given system.

Cultural anthropology. Yet, man is more than a gregarious animal with uncles, grandfathers, sons and nephews — he composes poetry, paints pictures (or, if inadept as the present writer, records them on Kodachrome), worships deities and manufactures thermonuclear devices. In short, man has culture. And to understand what he has been doing with it for the last million years, the archaeologist (an anthropologist with a vertical view back through time) studies manufacturing techniques of prehistoric stone tools, design qualities of painted potsherds, or metallurgical methods manifested by the wares of an ancient "artificer in brass and iron."

The dynamics of the medium by which these ideas have been handed

2. The layman might object to the slightest implication that human society is in any way comparable with that of apes. Without treating the evidence at length, we can only say here that an impassionate review of the social behavior of such Primates as howler monkeys, baboons, gibbons, and chimpanzees is suggestive (without anthropomorphizing the data) of certain aspects of human society. Again, the reason for the tremendous gap between man's society and that of other animals is *culture,* which has so embellished the social structure of the former.

down from one generation to another, is the province of the linguist (also an anthropologist, but usually a highly specialized one). After painstakingly recording the odd vocalizations of even the most insignificant groups of "savages," he has concluded there is no such thing as an inferior language, and whether an American says "I shall" or "I will" is purely a matter of prevailing custom and not dependent upon irrevocable grammatical laws.

Now let us pause momentarily to take inventory of what our indefatigable anthropologist has found throughout the vicissitudes of his intellectual peregrination. In a word, it is this: An intelligent, featherless biped is unique among all other earthly creatures — not because of a few minor anatomical variations from his gorilla and chimpanzee "cousins" — but because he possesses *culture.* Culture, the touchstone of anthropological theory. Other animals seem to have vague, incipient forms of culture, but only Homo sapiens phenomenalizes it in spacetime.[3]

Among the hundreds of definitions of culture, that of E. B. Tylor is still quite adequate: "Culture, or civilization, . . . is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society."[4]

Anthropology as a point of view

After a big day of talking shop with experts in geology, art, medicine, sociology, language, zoology, psychology, clothing design, religion, history and economics, the evening finds our exhausted anthropologist settling down in a comfortable easy-chair (quite possibly designed from body measurements taken by a fellow anthropologist) and, amid the puffs of his pipe, wondering if, after all, he is not just as much a philosopher as anyone else. Could it be that the net result of all his study — at least in his own mind — has been the acquisition of a unique point of view?

Among the most venerable of living anthropologists is A. L. Kroeber, who has written:

> Basically, the main values of anthropology perhaps lie in a residual attitude — an attitude intellectually arrived at, but thereafter one of emotional surcharge and significance. This is the realization of ethnocentricity as one of the great perverters of truth, alike in thinking and in acting; and the recognition of culture as being the conceptual means of breaking the hold of this shackle. To see and appraise humanity and its works, and men and their deeds, and beyond that man's relation to nature — to see these free from the distortions of ethnocentricity, with full acceptance of all attainable objectivity whether painful or pleasant; to contribute to such an attitude is perhaps the largest contribution of anthropology.[5]

After studying the total culture of scores of different ethnic groups, and

3. Behind all manifestations of culture is the *idea.* Ideational activitiy exists eternally in the person of God, but only became a phenomenon of nature when Homo sapiens came upon the scene.
4. *Primitive Culture,* (New York, 1877), I, 1.
5. *Anthropology,* rev. ed. (New York, 1948), p. 849.

seeing how each culture represents a unique and functional synthesis of its peculiar choice of cultural entities, it is little wonder that the anthropologist can, with relative facility, disengage himself from his own culture, and understand why other peoples "live as they do." Small wonder, too, that he deplores the ethnocentric bigotry of some people when they deal with persons outside their own culture. This ability to extricate oneself (never completely, of course) from one's own cultural matrix can be of incalculable value to the Christian too, not only when he endeavors to explain the Gospel to a person of another culture, but also when he strives to understand more fully the cultural milieu whence *comes* the Gospel.

Anthropology in the Christian Weltanschauung

After having made this cursory examination of the subject matter and attitudes of anthropology, we are now able to discuss the place of anthropology in the Christian *Weltanschauung.*

Anthropology in Christian Thought. What does the concept of culture have to do with understanding the Bible? By way of answering, let us ask another question: If cultures differ from one geographic location to another and change from one age to the next, how does this affect the revelation, transmission and interpretation of God's Word?

As "men moved by the Holy Spirit spoke from God,"[6] they did so in terms which were compatible with their own culture. This culture, in turn, was not specially created by God in a single act, but was part of a long development of culture from which branched other cultures contemporaneous with that one to which God revealed Himself. Undoubtedly, the "chosen culture" was being directed by God's providence so that, as with Christ's incarnation, His revelation could enter history at "the fulness of time." Notwithstanding, the culture from which these inspired men spoke was similar in over-all development to surrounding cultures, and the holy men themselves were products of their culture.[7]

Transcendental truths revealed by God thus became imbedded in a cultural matrix at one particular point in spacetime — like gold in a vein of quartz or slate. The gold, then, is transmitted through history with parts of its original matrix still attached. To catastrophically change metaphors, we have the truth, as it were, in a nutshell. To get the nourishing meat, we need to peel off the shell (the former cultural matrix). But surely God has not made understanding his message contingent upon

6. II Pet. 1: 21. This and all subsequent Biblical quotations are from the RSV (1946).
7. This does not preclude the fact that the cultures into which God spoke were thereby able to possess unique truths. To mention a famous example, the cosmology of Genesis is quite distinct from the fantastic cosmologies of its times.

understanding the concept of culture! And voracious Christians who eat shell and all, thrive on it! Other less hearty souls prefer the succulent nutmeat alone. "Let not him who eats despite him who abstains, and let not him who abstains pass judgment on him who eats."[8]

A voluminous work could be written on the interaction of Bible and culture. Let a single example from the New Testament suffice for now. Braided hair was fashionable for women of St. Paul's day. The Apostle, making sure that devout ladies did not follow the frivolous fashions of worldly vanity, instructed Timothy to discourage the practice. In that culture, at that time, this was meaningful. But how should a girl feel about it today? Without doing violence to conservative exegesis, she could say, as a Christian, she should not emulate the appearance of an entertainment enchantress (I refrain from shibboleths to avoid being an inadvertent publicity agent). By thus cultivating a modest air she can — braid hair though she might! — contentedly comply with the Biblical injunction *not* to braid hair. The curious thing about all this is that the situation has pretty much changed around, and one does not see too many chic models with braided hair!

Because culture changes, a single aspect of Christian piety may have opposite manifestations at different points in spacetime. Another example of this phenomenon can be taken from history. Witness, during the early centuries, the dirty and perspiring Christian who denounced the ungodly custom of taking a bath, because the pagan Romans did it. The slogan then must have been: "Cleanliness is next to godlessness!" But now rescue mission workers and foreign missionaries often remark how, after a person becomes a Christian, he washes himself, as if soap and salvation were timeless concomitants.

H. Richard Niebuhr has made an astute observation about this interplay of God's truth with culture:

> . . . Christianity, whether defined as church, creed, ethics, or movement of thought, . . . moves between the poles of Christ and culture. . . . When Christianity deals with the question of reason and revelation, what is ultimately in question is the relation of the revelation in Christ to the reason which prevails in culture. When it makes the effort to distinguish, contrast, or combine rational ethics with its knowledge of the will of God, it deals with the understanding of right and wrong developed in the culture and with good and evil as illumined by Christ.[9]

The sentiment we wish to convey is that anthropology will not enable us to be any richer in grace or more realistically hopeful about Jesus' return, but it may furnish stimulating insights into parts of Scripture and make the Christian way more logical to the curious mind.

8. Rom. 14: 3.
9. *Christ and Culture* (New York, 1956), p. 11.

A most interesting coincidence of subject matter between anthropology and Christianity is the dichotomy of man. Although terms from the two approaches cannot be exactly equated, there is a similarity between thinking about man as "carnal" and thinking about him as animal. Too, man's having a "spirit" is much the same as his having a capacity for culture.

The anthropologist sees Homo sapiens as a highly evolved Primate. Somehow, perhaps through genetic mutation (the Christian can say "through creation"), this animal acquired culture, which serves dramatically to distinguish him from all other animals. Because he views man along with protozoa, echinoderms, reptiles, and mammals, the anthropologist can rationally go about treating "carnal" man as one hundred percent animal. And when concerned with culture, anthropologists shift gears to get up to a different level of analysis where man stands alone.

Instead of transferring this uniqueness which is man's for having culture, to his biological make-up (so that spirit is mingled with flesh), the Christian may as well face up to the fact that, as an organism, man is just another animal. Homo sapiens can only claim real biological distinction for his large, delicately convoluted brain, and — from one extreme to the other — for his large, undelicately bunion-bedecked feet. Yet, the creature has within it the awesome capacity for bearing culture — a culture ofttimes contrary to the "flesh." The immortal words of St. Paul graphically depict this antinomy:

> For I delight in the law of God, in my inmost self, but I see in my members another law at war with the law of my mind and making me captive to the law of sin which dwells in my members. Wretched man that I am! Who will deliver me from this body of death? Thanks be to God through Jesus Christ our Lord! So then, I of myself serve the law of God with my mind, but with my flesh I serve the law of sin [Rom. 7: 22-25].

After having said that Jesus Christ is able to deliver "from this body of death," the Apostle explains how this is personally experienced:

> For those who live according to the flesh set their minds on the things of the flesh, but those who live according to the Spirit set their minds on the things of the Spirit [Rom. 8: 5].

The emancipation of cultural man from the human animal!

Life, as an evidence of the operation of God's providence in spacetime, came into existence some billion and a half years ago. Cultural man, another manifestation of God's creative power, came on the scene perhaps some million years ago. At first, according to Genesis, cultural man was a brilliant reflection of the image of its Creator, but after the Fall, this image was blurred by man's attempts to employ his unique cultural capacity for his own ends rather than God's. For this reason, his culture became but a dim semblance of the original perfect culture. The Christian, consequently, is not only exhorted to forsake all imperfect culture and to "flee youthful

lusts" — the animal — but to adopt a new culture which obliges him to "put off the old nature with its practices" (Cf. "capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society"), and to "put on the new nature, which is being renewed in knowledge after the image of its creator" (Col. 3: 9-10).

Regeneration is creation's sequel. Man is once again formed in the image of God — not by biological magic — but by "being renewed in *knowledge.*" Man is remade into God's image by *learning* new "capabilities and habits" (by being *acculturated,* in anthropological parlance), not as a member of an earthly society, but as a citizen of the community of Christ.

As the Christian grows in grace and in the knowledge of God, his experience is marked with an estrangement from natural impulses and an accompanying attention to spiritual pursuits. It is curious — or is it? — that an anthropologist has suggested that progress in a culture be measured by the degree to which anatomical and physiologocial references and actions have ceased to be evident: e.g., ornamenting oneself with a dead relative's skull, eating dead human flesh, puberty ceremonies, animal sacrifice and so forth.[10] In the same category, we could include the profane palaver about the anatomy and physiology of sex in our own culture, which far exceeds the bounds of the facts involved — be they ever so vital. A Harvard sociologist, Pitirim Sorokin, has just reemphasized that a preoccupation with sex marks cultural decline.[11]

In sum, cultural (and/or spiritual) advance exists where the human animal is more and more eclipsed by cultural man.

Anthropology in Christian practice. Let us now turn to some of the more directly applicable aspects of the science of man to Christian life and ministry.

A primary consideration, certainly of anthropology and also becoming more typical of Christianity, is the matter of race. With all his measuring and analyzing primitive peoples, the anthropologist has yet to discover a bona fide inferior race. Having knowledge which stems from the image of his Creator, the Christian also knows "there cannot be Greek and Jew, circumcised and uncircumcised, barbarian, Scythian, slave, free man, but Christ is all, and in all" (Col. 3: 11). Unfortunately, however, in contemporary experience these "racial" categories are sufficiently far removed from the scene of our culture, that we can safely say we believe this Scripture while, at the same time, we feel superior to a fellow human of

10. Kroeber, *Anthropology,* p. 300.
11. *The American Sex Revolution* (Boston, 1956), *passim.* It is to be regretted that Dr. Sorokin, in writing this book for popular consumption, did not document some of his sweeping generalizations. One is prone to conclude that many of the author's statements are highly emotional opinions rather than facts. Of course, you and I agree the opinions are good ones — and maybe others will too.

darker fleshly hues. The idea of white racial supremacy which so permeates our culture — and thus some Christians who live in it — has undoubtedly had negative influences on the spread of the Gospel. Indeed, the very lack of racial barriers in Mohammedanism has resulted in its phenomenal spread in Africa.[12] If "Christ is all, and in all" we should forget the irrelevant story of the servitude of Ham's sons, and approach humanity like Jesus did when, as servant, he washed his disciples' feet.

If Christianity is not ethnocentric, the missionary should not present it as if it were. He should strive to preach the Gospel, as much as possible uncontaminated by his own ethnocentrism. Here again anthropology is helpful. We have already mentioned Kroeber's stating that if anthropology does nothing else, it enables one to appraise another culture objectively. If the missionary could be thus extricated from his ethnocentrism, he would be more successful in translating the theocentric point of view into terms familiar to the culture in which he is working.[13]

Eugene Nida's *Customs and Cultures* is replete with examples of how some missionaries have inadvertently disrupted "primitive" cultures, because of not understanding their function.

> Missionaries . . . have had a share in such developments as the breakdown of clan loyalties (by denouncing respect for ancestors), lessening of community responsibility (by substituting missionary authority for that of the tribal elders), personality disintegration (by . . . weaning them away from old loyalties without giving them a corresponding sense of belonging to something else), and diminution of artistic skills . . . (by apparent wholesale condemnation of all sculpture, music and folk dancing as "bad," "immoral," or "debased") [p. 258].

As Dr. Nida aptly states, "It is high time that we rid ourselves of the 'Foreign Mission' complex, in which there is special virtue in being foreign" (p. 253).

Important though it be, anthropology is not the *sine qua non* of missionary work. The intelligent, spirit-filled missionary has always been a good anthropologist. Indeed, he has furnished the science of man with some of its best data.

Conclusion

That anthropology deserves a place in the Christian *Weltanschauung* is obvious. No other science has so much in common with the themes of Christianity. And should this very fact tempt the man of faith to disparage anthropology, let him first realize that the scientific method has, to date, been responsible for affording him incredible insights into the phenomenal world. It is the view of the present writer that such revelations of the

12. E. A. Nida, *Customs and Cultures* (New York, 1954), p. 70.
13. It is my impression that increasing numbers of missionaries are quite aware of this.

secrets of creation — and culture is a part of it! — have only served to magnify the Master's magnificence.

John Calvin had some good advice for anthropologists:

> True and substantial wisdom principally consists of two parts, the knowledge of God, and the knowledge of ourselves. . . . It is plain that no man can arrive at the true knowledge of himself, without having first contemplated the divine character, and then descended to considerations of his own.[14]

14. H. T. Kerr, Jr., ed., *A Compend of the Institutes of the Christian Religion by John Calvin* (Philadelphia, 1939), pp. 3, 4.

RADIOCARBON DATING—II

THOMAS H. LEITH

(*Continued from February, 1957 issue*)

Radiocarbon dating is the source of many of our fixed dates in the prehistoric period which is of such interest to many Christians. These dates are for materials containing Carbon, the figures being the age of the article since its removal from active interchange with the carbon dioxide of the air, which for the purposes of this article is generally the burial of the plant or animal matter. The ages depend on the realization that after removal from the carbon dioxide of the air, the Carbon-14 included in the Carbon of the object is no longer replenished as fast as it decays, so that a measurement of the current rate of disintegration enables us to calculate the time since this event.

In the last issue we discussed the detailed theory behind the method and argued for the apparent reasonableness of assuming the essential constancy in the major natural factors involved over the last 50,000 years or so.[1] This gives us confidence, in general, in the validity of potential dating across the interval currently attainable by our measuring instruments. However, this does not assure the accuracy of any given date determined. For this we need suitable specimens with contaminants carefully eliminated and elaborate precautions to ensure accurate determination of the rate of disintegration of the C^{14} in the sample. To these factors we will now turn.

1. It has recently been suggested that the earth's magnetic field may have weakened in the recent past. Since this field deflects cosmic rays somewhat from the earth the amount of cosmic rays reaching the earth would then be larger today than in the past. The rate of radiocarbon formation being governed by this, it is suggested that 4000-year-old samples might be in error by as much as 1000 years when dated by our method. The writer does not think that the good checks on known archeological dates allow this criticism to stand; hence, while it seems a sound argument, the data used to reveal changes in the earth's total field must somewhere be in error.

A great deal of thought and experiment has gone into deciding just what makes a specimen satisfactory as the source of a good date. It should be obvious that the older the article to be dated, the more will generally small error-causing factors become important. The smaller quantity of C^{14} remaining, the more might such things as instrument errors, minute amounts of chemical exchange or replacement, possible small variations of the C^{14}:C^{12} ratio in carbonates and organic materials of different types, and production of C^{14} by neutrons after burial cause erroneous ages to be applied to the specimen. Some have suggested, however, that these factors are always important and often overlooked; a claim, the validity of which to a specimen of any age, we must examine.

Leaving the question of instrumentation and actual measurement of decay, with their associated errors, until later let us first study the problem of chemical interchange and replacement. By this we mean the transfer of carbonaceous matter in particular from the surroundings to the specimen, or vice versa, at any time after it leaves equilibrium with the CO_2 of the atmosphere. Theoretically this could either remove C^{14} from, or add it to, the specimen, thereby increasing or decreasing respectively the apparent age. We saw in the last issue that it is unlikely that there will be a selective loss or addition of the radioactive C^{14} isotope in preference to the other stable isotopes of Carbon since the exchange is chemical and unaffected by the nature of the particular Carbon atoms involved. Hence it is just a question of the removal or addition of undifferentiated Carbon that should interest us at the moment, though we will discuss the selectivity question below.

We mentioned earlier that it is improbable that there will be any important exchange of Carbon atoms in the large molecules of organic materials but that exchange is more likely in inorganic materials such as carbonate in shells. For this reason shells are less desirable for dating than, say, charcoal and are always carefully examined for signs of alteration by water percolating around them after burial. But the problem is not just this simple since we still may get contamination by physical, chemical, or biological agencies, of the specimens by younger carbon. Bartlett (*Science*, Vol. 114, p. 55, 1951) and Hunt (*Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 81, p. 240, 1955) have discussed this in detail. Physical contamination may occur in tiny cracks in a specimen and, if it is organic, it is difficult to detect. Most other dirt, young rootlets in young charcoal, etc., are relatively easy, though laborious, to remove. Chemical and biological contamination in moist soils cause more trouble. Fresh carbon is added continually from the decay of plants and animals of all sizes and this penetrates deeply in soluble or gaseous form. Buried organic materials may thus suffer change in their

C^{14}:C^{12} ratio by soaking in soluble organic compounds or by consequent fungal or bacterial attack. Temperature, the formation of by-products that check the activity, and the depth of burial of the specimen controlling moisture and aeration are factors that will vary the importance of these effects.

The latter writer named above feels a number of dates require change by reason of these considerations. Others feel experience has shown that grass, buried leaves and twigs, and even peat have checked with well-preserved wood found with them. Too, they feel chemical treatment of the sample will remove most of the foreign contamination or putrefaction. The differences of opinion are not easily resolved as those who feel error does arise here are often led to the conclusion, not by the arguments they present, but by certain apparent lack of harmony in dates from dry and wet regions, which requires explanation. While the writer feels that great care must be exercised with such specimens as may have suffered this contamination, and further study on the biochemistry involved is essential, the case has yet to be proven and may rather be resolved frequently by seeking a solution in the area of interpretation of the dating stratigraphically.

One point must be stressed here. This is that contamination of the type above *lowers* the apparent age compared to the actual age of the disturbed specimen. While one abhors the possibility of error in any direction, these considerations can do little to aid those who desire to use them for shortening the time-span involved. For details of dating problems currently raised, see Antevs (*Jour. of Geol.,* Vol. 63, p. 495, 1955), Ruhe and Leighton (*Jour. of Geol.,* Vol. 64, p. 191, 1956), and Iversen (*Science,* Vol. 118, p. 9, 1953).[2]

Let us now turn to the last two potential sources of error. First is the possibility of difference in the initial ratio of C^{14}:C^{12} in carbonates and organic materials of the same real age which would make one appear younger than the other. What variation is observed is very small. Specimens of shell and charcoal from the same site have checked out well, as have contemporary materials of a great variety of types. Hence any selectivity of absorption or loss of radiocarbon mentioned above in one material as differing from another must be very small. The theoretically calculated differences possible are of the order of the errors in measuring

2. Recently Prof. Zeuner of London announced errors for radiocarbon dates secured at Jericho. He explained these on the basis of the alkaline nature of some of the specimens, the alkali having apparently leached some of the carbon from the specimen. This resulted in the specimens appearing *older* in Carbon-14 dating than was actually true. While this is an exception to the general tendency for chemical action to make the apparent age *younger* than is actually the case, it would only be true of specimens from similar 'chemically washed' areas and likely does not apply to any of the dates to be given later.

the decay rate (H. Craig, *Jour. of Geol.,* Vol. 62, p. 115, 1954), and, since both increase in importance in old specimens, the factor is very likely not too bothersome at any time.

Lastly, as to the production of C^{14} after burial of the specimen, Robson (*Phy. Rev.,* Vol. 83, p. 349, 1951) considers the half-life of the neutron produced by the cosmic rays to be so short that penetration below ground is probably small and insignificant. Other researchers agree.

We may now turn to instrumentation and technique. In instrumentation, the major problem is sensitivity to decay in the specimen and lack of sensitivity to, or shielding from, outside cosmic ray and radioactive contamination. In technique, the sample is to be prepared so as to ensure measurement of only the C^{14} present at burial or death. We saw that using larger molecules of wood and grasses and unaltered shells likely prevents contamination errors here. Bone is used very little because of the small amount of carbon included and because of the likelihood of alteration. Whatever the sample, it is cleaned if possible and, if large enough, has its surface removed to reduce the chance of contamination. Calcium carbonate, deposited in cracks from underground water, and putrefaction products are likely largely, if not entirely, removed by hydrochloric acid treatment.

Samples are then handled in various ways depending on the instrument used. For one type, samples are burned to CO_2 if organic or treated with hydrochloric acid to evolve CO_2 if the sample is shell; sufficiently large specimens being used to evolve a usable amount of carbon dioxide, say some 20 liters. After removal of contaminants from this gas, the CO_2 is reduced to Carbon and weighed. Libby, in his book, discusses the technique in great detail with the many precautions observed, as do many papers listed in the National Research Council *Reports.* The next step is to measure the radioactivity of this concentrated Carbon in such a way as to ensure maximum ratio of counts due to Carbon-14 disintegration to counts due to cosmic radiation and radioactivity of the surrounding room. This is done in varying ways using equipment that counts all radiation entering it. Since we desire this radiation to be as largely due to Carbon-14 as possible, the equipment is built to shield outside radiation. Often, huge iron shields are used surrounding the counter and 'anti coincidence' counters are placed within them and encircling the radiocarbon counter. Mercury may be used as a ring directly around the Carbon-14 counter and it is considered that contamination of the lab and even the shield, as well as cosmic ray mesons, is cut down by these precautions from about 500 to less than 2 counts/minute.

However, atomic bomb tests and other factors contaminate the air so badly that filtered air is used in the lab, or some laboratories use Carbon

in the form of acetylene, methane, or carbon dioxide in their measurements, thus allowing testing away from air. Also gas-filled counters are quite sensitive and generally enable measurement of older materials than those above (H. E. Suess, *Science,* Vol. 120, p. 5, 1954, and H. R. Brannon et al., *Rev. of Sci. Instr.,* Vol. 26, p. 269, 1955). A new development of great importance is the use of scintillation counters which pick up tiny flashes of light invisible to our eye which result from the radiocarbon decaying in a hydrocarbon fluid. The whole is shielded to count almost pure beta decay from the Carbon-14 and, if sufficient sample is available, greatly increased sensitivity can be attained with more fluid and a larger number of the counting photo-multiplier tubes (F. N. Hayes et al., *Phy. Rev.,* Vol. 92, p. 512, 1955; J. R. Arnold, *Science,* Vol. 119, p. 155, 1954; and R. W. Pringle et al., *Science,* Vol. 125, p. 69, 1957).

Counting is carried on for sufficient time to ensure adequate determination of background count and total count so that a good estimate of rate of radiocarbon emission of beta rays may be obtained. The total number of Carbon-14 counts divided by the total number of minutes through which they occurred gives the average decay per minute. This is quoted with a plus and minus range of error, the error being the standard deviation which is an error in counting random events of this type giving added weight to extreme values. Both the rate and error are converted into years as described in the last paper, so we get such dates as 1460 $\pm$ 200 years b.p. (before the present). The error figure is *not* the extreme limits of possibility, as is often mistakenly assumed even by archeologists, but simply indicates that if the distribution of counts is 'normal' (see any statistics text), there is a 68.3% chance of the correct value lying within this range and a 95.5% chance of it lying within twice this range. In other words, a range of plus or minus one standard deviation means a two to one chance that the actual date lies within that limit and a range of two standard deviations means a 21:1 chance that the actual date lies within those limits.

It is apparent that the longer a count is taken on a sample, the smaller will be the standard deviation. Generally samples are counted for 48 hours or so for convenience and to obtain adequate accuracy for as many samples in as short a time as possible. Longer count periods are taken (up to several months) on some old or weak specimens and particularly in dating objects of great archeological importance. It is similarly apparent that if we date older specimens the standard deviation will increase. As a consequence, the maximum age attainable for any technique is arbitrarily taken as the age where the count rate is about four times the standard deviation (the range covered by four standard deviations includes 99.99% of the possible dates,

or there is only a chance of one in ten thousand of the date being outside this range).

We may conclude this portion of our paper by remarking that not only is the margin of error, as stated statistically, much larger than often assumed, but it reaches such dimensions in older specimens that dating, even with the improved scintillation counter, is limited to some 50,000 years. In addition, the dates, being for the relatively recent past, should come out as accurately as possible and here the half-life of radiocarbon is the dominant feature. Currently this is in dispute by several hundred years, which in fifty millenia amounts to some 2000 to 4000 years. Being the least necessary source of error in the method, this demands early resolution to the satisfaction of all concerned. However, as stated previously, it has no effect on *relative* dates determined by the method as long as the same half-life is used in all cases. It is not always the same from one researcher to the next and should be carefully noted if comparison of the dates they present is to be made.

Having described the principles of the radiocarbon method of dating, let us now turn to some of the dates obtained by the technique. We will only sketch a few which are of interest to the general reader, leaving out many dates of more technical importance. This is done at the risk of misleading, since the writer feels that the value of the method lies, not only in the more popular and startling dates it sometimes gives, but in its aid to the establishing of detailed archeological, anthropological, and geological chronologies.

One date of considerable interest lies in the area of glacial geology. In Wisconsin, logs of an old spruce forest living in swamp mosses and clay were dated several years ago. Killed while still green, showing poor growth just before death, and generally pointing south they were considered to be intimately connected to the last Ice Age. Geologists construed that a lake, formed by the glacier damming the mouth of the Lake Michigan basin, drowned the forest and that subsequently the ice moved over the area and extended some twenty-five miles to the southwest. The logs then give us a date for just prior to the end of the last Ice Age. The average of their ages is just over 11,000 years b.p. with an error of about 3%. The date is confirmed by wood buried in a river terrace on the Missouri where glaciation clogged the river with silt from the north, raised its level, and eroded this terrace where a log was buried. The date for this log is 12,148 $\pm$ 700 years b.p. Additional agreement is found from peat in southern Quebec which gives an age of 11,050 $\pm$ 400 years, from Danish sediments of peat and lime dated at just over 11,000 years to about 5%, and from glacial lake sediments in this country and from near-glacial climate zones in Europe which give figures in good agreement.

The dates may not seem of much interest to many readers until they are told that until recently most geologists considered the last glaciation to have ended some *twenty-five* thousand years ago. Having now shortened this interval, we must re-date all previous recent glacial advances (there were three) even though we cannot use Carbon-14 directly to do so as they lie outside the range of measurement. This is so because their ages are assigned on the basis of comparison of depths of leaching in soil exposed since the last glaciation with depths of leaching in soils exposed between the former glacial advances. If the time of leaching is lessened for the former it must apparently be decreased in proportion for the latter. As this will shorten the whole Pleistocene period, it will seriously effect the old astronomical method of dating and explaining glaciations. But more than this, all anthropological dates for 'fossil men' assigned as absolute dates will require revision perhaps by as much as 50%. This is because they are dated relative to the Pleistocene ice fluctuations.

Mentioning only the date assigned for the oldest food-producing village economy, Jarmo in Iraq, as 6707 ± 320 years ago for the lowest level dated; the date for a platform in England as 9488 ± 350 years ago: and the date for charcoal from a cave in France as 15516 ± 900 years ago, let us turn to some figures in the western hemisphere. For years, many scientists considered the settlement of this part of the world to have been much more recent than the dates to be given below — hence our interest. Too, these dates will raise certain questions as to their relation with many schemes of Biblical interpretation. The following are of some import here.

In Chile, burned human and animal bones found with artifacts in a cave have been dated at over 8600 years of age. Sandals from a cave in Oregon are 9053 ± 350 years old. Burned bison bone in Texas associated with strata of the same type as that containing Folsom material in New Mexico, and having Folsom-type dart-heads in it, has an age of about 9900 years to some 3%. A Utah cave gives a continuous record in rubbish for 11453 ± 600 years. A woman's skull near Midland, Texas found with human bone splinters and dart-heads has been dated as greater than 20,000 years old. Charcoal, believed to be of human origin, in Nevada and found with mammoth and camel bones scraped and broken by tools is dated as greater than 23,800 years (this was the limit of the instrument sensitivity). Charred mammoth bones from old fire sites at Santa Rosa island in California are said to be over 29,000 years.

Recently charcoal from a hearth 20 feet below the surface of a river terrace in Texas has been dated as over 37,000 years old. Bison, deer, wolf, and rabbit bones accompany the wood along with clam shells and charred seeds. A Clovis projectile point was found less than two feet

away. Another hearth some 300 feet northeast, and connected by an area of hearths and faunal remains to the above site, yielded three small logs, charred terrapin bones, snail shells, and charred seeds. The logs dated at over 37,000 years also.

It must be obvious that such dates not only demand revision in ideas as to the time of settlement of the hemisphere, but provide the Bible student with a number of problems. With such a continuous settlement in the west, flood ideas and genealogical interpretations may have to be re-studied. The writer thinks that resolution of these questions may be suggested, but that is the subject for another paper. Whatever the coherence finally satisfactory, the problem must not be ignored!

BRIEF BIBLIOGRAPHY

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2. On Carbon-14 see:
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3. On anthropology and dating see:
   A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology Today,* Chicago, 1953, and S. Tax et al., *An Appraisal of Anthropology Today,* Chicago, 1953.

COMMENT

A Note on Language and Theology

The present note in connection with Dr. Curtis' recent two contributions is not intended as a full rejoinder. Rather, for brevity's sake we shall strictly confine ourselves to one main point, prefaced by a short preliminary remark.

The form chosen by Dr. Curtis is extremely baffling, for it is difficult to see how a set of fifty-five questions, interlarded with extensive footnotes, can really give expression to a clearly conceived position. Since in most cases no answer to the questions is supplied, one has to ferret out for oneself what answer, if any, is implicit in the footnotes or in the general trend of the article. This gives to the whole treatment an unpleasantly elusive character, which we trust was not intended as such, but which places an excessively heavy burden on the reader. As a device in communication, the effectiveness of this approach is certainly open to question.

The main purpose of the present note is to advert to Dr. Curtis' position on the inspiration and infallibility of Scripture, as it seems to be delineated toward the end of his paper.

1. This view appears characterized by an emphatic rejection of the traditional conception of the absoluteness of Scripture: ". . . the immeasurable difficulty attending the insistence that we conceive of Scripture in absolute terms. . . . If the truth of Scripture is relative rather than absolute, or probable rather than certain . . ." (p. 21). This mood comes to the fore also when Dr. Curtis scores as "pathological" "man's devotion to the sign [the written text] rather than to the revelation (God in

Christ)" (p. 22). The traditional conservative view of Scripture is rather transparently the target here.

2. Dr. Curtis insistently envisions man's active reception as an integral element of the truth, without which truth has no objective reality. "To what extent does Scripture become true in leading us to the incarnate Word of God? To the degree that it becomes . . . incarnate in the life of the believer" (p. 21). ". . . The degree to which Christians incarnate the living Word of God" (p. 22). ". . . Our own part in making the word of God the Word of God . . ." (p. 22).

We note particularly the expressions "the Scripture becomes true," and we "make the word of God [the Scripture] the Word of God [real revelation]."

Now, evangelical Christians are eager to acknowledge the importance of the subjective appropriation of truth, but not to the extent of asserting that truth has no objective reality apart from it. Rather, a strong emphasis on the intrinsic and self-contained truth of Scripture has always characterized the evangelical view of inspiration. With its roots firmly planted in Biblical soil, and specifically in the utterances of our Lord Himself (e.g. John 10: 35), as our previous letter indicated, this position has enjoyed the overwhelming acceptance of the Christian Church from the very beginning. Among its notable modern proponents we may name L. Gaussen, J. J. Bannerman, H. M'Intosh, B. B. Warfield, Th. Engelder, R. Preus, and this very year 1957, R. L. Harris, B. Ramm, W. Broomall, E. J. Young, to mention only a few who have written on this subject special volumes available in English!

It is precisely in this respect that we observe one of the key differences between the Neo-Orthodox and the traditional conservative view of Scripture, and on this point Dr. Curtis manifestly appears to align himself with the former.

3. Dr. Curtis appears to favor a shift from a dependence upon the absoluteness of the inscripturated Word, which he holds untenable, to a direct appeal to the absoluteness of the Incarnate Word of God, Jesus Christ. (Cf. pp. 21, 22.)

a. Now, this type of shift is scarcely a theological novelty: in various forms, it was characteristic of much of the liberal and mediating theology of the last century. Hugh M'Intosh's *Is Christ Infallible and the Bible True?,* which has been on the market for more than fifty years, contains an able refutation of it.

b. Even if this approach were accepted, we would still have to ask where we might gain our knowledge of Jesus. If in the Scriptures, we are back where we started! Furthermore, the recorded utterances of Jesus concerning the Scripture give no support to Dr. Curtis' position, but rather countenance the traditional view.

c. Even if this difficulty were overlooked, the thoroughgoing principle of relativism advocated by Dr. Curtis works just as great havoc with an absolute incarnate revelation as with an absolute written revelation. The remarks of note 38, if valid at all against Scripture, will carry away with the flood the ruins of the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation. Indeed, if the relativity of the recipient inevitably extends to any communication made to him, it is perfectly obvious that the incarnate Christ Himself, as a revelation from God, will become enmeshed in relativism. A suitable warning on this point had been given, we believe, in our previous letter (*Gordon Review,* December 1955), but apparently it is necessary to emphasize it still further.

In view of the elusive form of Dr. Curtis' presentation, it is conceivable that in the present analysis we have failed to construe properly his views at some points, or that we have ascribed to merely tentative or heuristic remarks a note of finality which he did not intend. If so, we shall be only too glad to discover that his postiion is less distant from traditional orthodoxy than we had been led to fear. At the present juncture, however, we felt it imperative to enter a clear *caveat,* for if our appraisal of Dr. Curtis be accurate, the whole case simply goes to show that it is not possible to absorb large doses of the logical positivism so often associated with general semantics, and to prevent the corrosive effects of that philosophy from undermining the essential positions of evangelical Christianity.

— *Roger Nicole*

REVIEW–ARTICLES

The Christian Recovery of Human Worth

Christian Personal Ethics, by Carl F. H. Henry. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1957. xi + 615 pp. $6.95.

Dr. Carl F. H. Henry, Professor of Theology and Christian Philosophy at Fuller Theological Seminary, is one of the leading theologians and philosophers of religion in evangelical circles today. With a background of intensive training and experience in both theology and philosophy, he is admirably suited to the task of presenting a critical analysis of the whole field of ethical valuation. He has fulfilled this promise in his comprehensive study of the problems of morality from the viewpoint of speculative philosophy and revealed theology. The basic theme of the volume may be expressed as the loss of human worth in modern life and the basis of its recovery in the sphere of Christian redemption.

The text is divided into two main sections: (1) speculative philosophy and the moral quest; (2) Christianity and the moral revelation: the redemption of the moral life. By far the larger treatment is given to the latter division. Thus, instructors who are considering it for a course in philosophical ethics from the Christian standpoint may be initially disappointed. However, since the philosophical section runs to 142 pages, the book is seen to be the equivalent of at least a small text. It is of course true that the full treatment of a primarily philosophical approach can hardly be accomplished in such brief compass. On the other hand, it may come as a surprise on reflection to realize that the over 400 pages devoted to what would usually be thought of as theological ethics, actually supplies the positive development of an adequate theory and application and thus accomplishes in effect what one would expect in the more conventional text in speculative ethics. We are not suggesting that this volume is the latter sort of text or that it fulfills only this function, but we do believe that it can serve well as, for example, a college text. Yet, it is undoubtedly true that it is more suited as it stands for a course in Christian ethics (with perhaps a bit less of an emphasis on classical moral philosophy than is usual), or a seminary course in theological ethics.

Let this not minimize the high quality and comprehensiveness of the treatment of speculative moral philosophy. This section is divided into three parts whose titles are most illuminating as to the presentation of the material and the evaluation of the progression: (1) naturalistic ethics and the animalization of the moral life; (2) idealistic ethics and the deification of the moral life; (3) existential ethics and the intensification of the

moral life. Henry traces the levels of each orientation (naturalistic, idealistic, and existential) from the elemental through the systematic form, and in the case of the existential perspective through the "revelational" level. The discussion is adequate in each subsection and the coverage of men and schools excellent. The obvious historical structure of the development of the outline and the association of each ethical type with its classic representatives should be most helpful to the student. Then too, the choice of representatives of schools and of the relevant aspects of their theories is most helpful. One is accustomed to find Hobbes, for example, discussed from the perspective of his metaphysics with hardly a word on the social root of his ethics. Henry deals with Hobbes as a systematic naturalist with basically a political orientation, and compares and contrasts him with Thrasymachus, Machiavelli, Nietzsche, and Marx. This is certainly one of the best approaches one could take and it is but a sample of the quality of the work Henry has performed. In the same way he concludes his philosophic survey with existential ethics — a feature that is as yet unusual even in the most up-to-date studies.

The larger section of the text deals, as we have observed, with Christian ethics. This could constitute a volume by itself, showing that what we have here is really two books in one — an advantage from the point of view of comprehensiveness but perhaps a disadvantage in reference to purchase and use when one or the other study is primarily in view, but not both. In fact, the author and publisher might seriously consider making this large volume into two, and in the process developing the philosophic section somewhat more fully, though of course always from the evangelical Christian viewpoint.

In the twenty-two good-sized chapters that comprise the theological section, Dr. Henry sketches the Christian view from its relation to speculative ethics (and its uniqueness and superiority thereto) to the specific content of the Christian moral life. Unlike liberal theologians who let ethics take the place of theology, Henry roots and grounds his ethics in revealed theology and relates the moral data at every point to the redemptive structure in terms of which it is to be understood. But the relevance of all this to personal decision and action is never lost sight of: Christianity is a religion of personal salvation and personal morality. This is the basis of all social and other application of ethical principles. In this light, he treats the classic areas and problems of ethics: the good as the will of God as Lord, the divine imperative in personal relations, the Biblical particularization of the normal life, the law and the gospel (antinomianism is effectively refuted), Christ as our example, Christian liberty, the Holy Spirit as our ethical dynamic, New Testament virtues, conscience, sanctions, eschatology, and prayer.

With a book of this extent and comprehensiveness, it is impossible to expound the whole in a review; nor is this indeed the purpose of a review. What is relevant is the sampling of a characteristic portion, and to this end we choose the chapter on "New Testament Principles of Conduct." This could as well be entitled, "Christian Liberty." Henry is to be commended in his handling of this difficult and explosive area. His insight is usually clear and his principles far-reaching. He begins by observing that "the New Testament does not give a rule to cover every possibility in life" (419). Christ stood against any such Pharisaical attempt: a law in itself cannot provide for inner purity, nor is it possible to have a law for every conceivable situation. Rather, one must know the New Testament *principles* of conduct and decide and act in the light of them. "By this terrifying and responsible process, he matures ethically. There is no other way" (419). Henry then goes on to develop a number of these New Testament principles. They are as follows:

(1) "The believer's life is one of *Christian liberty* in grace" (420). Here he enunciates the classic Christian insistence that nothing is unclean in itself. Christian ethics is not world-denying but "world-affirming because it is an ethics that presupposes creation and redemption" (420). The law, neither in whole or in part, is a means of salvation. This, says Henry, "condemns much of what is called 'Fundamentalism' in America today" (420). The reason is that in practice Fundamentalism "requires the believer to abstain from certain 'social evils' in order to be accepted before God. . . . Christian ethics become an index of legalistic 'dont's'" (420). Such a view forgets that "sanctification is not a mere abstinence, it is the Lordship of Christ and the rule of the Spirit" (421). When the issue of the conscience of the weaker brother is raised, it must be insisted that since even a Christian conscience is not infallible, the conscientious objection of the weaker brother "does not in itself have final validity. . . . *It may be the conduct of the stronger believer is definitely to be approved and vindicated*" (421, italics ours). "The weak, too, must recognize the principle of Christian liberty, and not offend the strong" (422). Too frequently, Fundamentalists condemn certain actions for inadequate reasons. "There is nothing inherently evil about the camera or dancing or wine" (422).

(2) "Christian life is for the purpose of *glorifying* God, and not for the purpose of sin" (423).

> It is quite revealing to compare the ethical teaching of Jesus and Paul with the code of Fundamentalism. Jesus and Paul require moral integrity from within the heart of man. The code of Fundamentalism emphasizes external adherence to a few arbitrary customs and external abstinence from a few arbitrarily prohibited things. When a Fundamentalist is pressed with this analysis, he will, of

> course, deny it. He, too, is vitally concerned with inner moral integrity. But one cannot escape the impression that his main interest is in his code. . . . The fundamentalist catalogue of "sins" is small and specific: commercial movies, dancing, gambling, card-playing, drinking beer or wine or liquor, and smoking. No "spiritual Christian" will presumably do any of these things, and generally will have little to do with anyone who does do them. Everyone who grows up in the tradition finds that it has a vise-like grip on him. His conscience has been made sensitive to these things by the never-ending tirade against them. . . . Th answer to [an issue's] moral rightness is already in mind before an investigation of the moral issues is made. It is against this mind-set in Fundamentalism that the writer wishes to protest. He is not arguing [for these things]. But he is concerned lest Christians confuse ethical living with an arbitrary legalistic bondage. . . . A proper emphasis must be restored to ethical thinking . . . so that the vicious sins of the spirit are seen as Jesus saw them [425-426].

(3) "The believer is to beware *defiling his conscience*" (426). What is right for one Christian may be wrong for another and vice versa. Henry properly censures the lack of the recognition of the individual in evangelical circles. (4) "The believer should *place no stumbling-block before weaker believers*" (428). He quotes Calvin: " 'Our liberty should be used if it conduces to our neighbor's edification: but if that be not beneficial to our neighbor, it should be abridged.' Calvin, *Institutes,* III, xix, xii" (429). The question, Henry observes, is often how we are to detect the pleading of a weak conscience when it is actually an excuse to further one's own will to power and what to do when an act appears to harm one but its omission would harm someone else (429-430). When he goes on to say that the believer cannot "continue in a practice which offends the conscience of another believer, even though it does not lead that one into an act of sin" (430), he seems to go beyond Scripture in that the Biblical concept of offense means to cause to stumble or to sin (and may very well have *only* in mind causing a brother to give up his profession of faith — for example, in the return to idols). Of course, Henry may mean by 'act' something overt, and be concerned that the attitude be considered as important as the outward act; however, one must be careful here lest an almost unknowable inner attitude become an excuse for leveling the Christian life to the narrow and misled position of the *weakest* brother. Henry's subsequent emphasis seems much more Biblical: "Love would not allow a brother to continue bound by a sub-Christian view of the freedom he has in Christ. . . . [But] a practice which is contrary to the dictates of a brother's conscience can be carried on only alongside of an enlightening of that brother's conscience" (431).

(5) "The believer's liberty is *not to be misused lest the cause of the Gospel is reproached by unbelievers*" (433). (6) "The Christian is *not to make common cause with the unbeliever, but is prohibited from entrance*

into pagan life for a mutual effort and aim" (433). This is to be understood as precluding associations, the standards of which are unchristian. (7) The believer may in special times be *answerable to an interim code as a temporary or local expedient"* (433). The counsels of church manuals or covenants are relevant here, but these must "be revised periodically as the culture itself changes" and they must not function as the criteria "of the true believer" (434).

Here Henry also finds an appropriate place to discuss "separation."

> This word is a shibboleth among Fundamentalists. "Come out from among them and be separate" may be used as a biblical excuse for cantankerous divisiveness, for a falsely pious withdrawal from non-Christian friends and their activities, or for an evasion of civic responsibilities. . . . [Quite opposed to this is the fact that] one who has a concern to find in cultural expression the best achievements of common grace and who has a desire to infuse into the general life of humanity the higher motif of redemption can walk in the midst of what may defile a weaker conscience. And he can be an ambassador. Designation of what aspects of the cultural enterprise are open to the Christian can never be a matter of legislation. All things are pure to the pure. But one must take care that he does not become the slave of some cultural practice [435-436].

With the above, he concludes his discussion of Christian liberty. It is the opinion of the reviewer that the sane, courageous, and truly Biblical spirit of this chapter is representative of the tone of the book as a whole, and he would recommend it as of great value to all interested in the Christian moral life.

The main text is followed by a bibliography arranged by subjects; for example: the Sermon on the Mount, general works, conscience, etc. Though not too extended, it is valuable as a guide to further study. Finally, there are rather complete indexes of persons, subjects, and Scripture.

—*Lloyd F. Dean*

Modern Man Seeking Salvation

The Outsider, by Colin Wilson. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1956. 288 pp. $4.00.

Everybody knows by now that young (24) Colin Wilson took highbrow London by storm last May and *The Outsider* became the most talked-about book of 1956. By a "staggeringly erudite" analysis of dozens of literary figures from Aristophanes to Sartre (or, depending on which side you are on, a superficial, "half-baked" concoction of speciously relevant material), Wilson has investigated the "sickness of mankind in the mid-twentieth century." Everybody who has read the reviews knows that he points toward "religion" as the only possible cure.

Despite the wide notice the book has received, its claims have not, so far as this reviewer knows, been examined from a Christian stand-

point, except in an excellent but very brief review in *America* (Oct. 6). Our purpose is to make such an examination.

It may be granted at the outset that the book does have many serious faults. It is riddled with typographical errors. The author jumps back and forth between two totally different systems of footnoting. He methodically barbarizes the English language (as in the term "Outsiderishness" for the quality about which he writes). He oversimplifies appallingly, he is far from scholarly, he tends to puff up obscure works which fit his thesis and ignore important ones which do not.

Yet *The Outsider* is an important book and should be read. For not only is its diagnosis of our age (especially in the first chapters) essentially sound, but the book itself is (what possibly the author did not intend it to be) an amazingly accurate *reflection* of intellectual currents of the 1950's.

Its immense popularity, especially in England, can only be explained on the grounds that Wilson has given verbal expression to ideas that are in the air. He has said, more or less concretely, what many people have been thinking vaguely.

Thus *The Outsider* can help us to understand our age not only by what the book says but by what it is; and understanding, to minister to our age's spiritual need.

The mass of mankind (Wilson says) lives in an unreal world, completely taken up in the pettinesses and trivialities of everyday living.

There are a few who sense this unreality: these are the Outsiders. In their search for reality they must cut themselves off from the mediocre world around them and proceed through what Wilson calls a "way of salvation." At the beginning they will feel only a desolation, a sense of futility and of what Wilson variously calls "a world full of misery," "a fundamental disharmony," "the Eternal No," and "Original Sin." Their only solution will be in an act of the Will — Jean Paul Sartre's *commitment* — but they must do this while still deprived of any motive, purpose, or moral values.

Up to this piont the Outsider is simply an Existentialist. As he advances to solving his problems he adds to his Existentialism Romanticism. Fleeting glimpses of reality turn his negative dissatisfaction with the world into a sort of Faustian striving.

"The Outsider's 'way of salvation' . . . is plainly implied. His moments of insight into his direction and purpose must be grasped tightly" (61). Life must become

> a succession of such moments. No doubt if he were a good Christian he would not expect anything so unreasonable; he would be contented to strive towards the Godly life and leave the rest to God.

> Being a romantic, . . . he feels that there *should* be a way of living with the intensity of the artist's creative ecstasy *all the time* [67].

This is the apex of "self-realization." It is (Wilson says) what the Bible means when it speaks of "life more abundant."

This leads to the contemplative mysticism of the Buddhist tradition. The "logical end" of the Outsider's contempt for his mediocre fellow-man is "anti-humanistic world-negation." In Lawrence of Arabia, one of the chief saints in Wilson's calendar, we see "an extreme of Asiatic world-contempt, the antithesis of the modern Western spirit" (79).

But the Existentialist emphasis on Will is continued, for "the effort of 'widening the soul' must be controlled by a religious discipline" (62). The ultimate in ascetic control must be exerted on body, intellect, and emotions all at once — not to suppress them but to refine them as vehicles for "self-realization." Will must dominate — "pure will, free of the perplexities of the intellect," in Nietzsche's phrase.

What this all points to is, quite simply, "a new religion." In fact, "the contention of this book" is that the new scheme of values which the Outsider seeks, to replace the old ones he has discarded, "are religious ones" (161). "Kierkegaard had the solution when he realized that the necessary intensity to fuse all his instincts and rational faculties lay in the religious attitude" (197). George Fox also had the solution in his "inner light," but he tried to institutionalize it in Quakerism and thereby failed; and William Blake and George Bernard Shaw had it in their vitalism; and the philosophy of the East has it as well.

We have here a pattern of salvation. All men are lost, fallen, although most do not realize it. Wilson defines the Fall psychologically as the splitting up of an integrated personality ("already guilty, already multiple," p. 61). He repeatedly uses the term "Original Sin" — "the absolute limiting principle" (279) which "insists that man lost his visionary faculty because he spends all his energy thinking about practical things" (232).

Those who confess their sin become the Outsiders; they have embarked on the difficult journey to salvation, have entered "the no-man's-land between hell and heaven" (187). The Outsider

> has deliberately cultivated his two opposing natures until the conflict threatens to tear him in two, because he knows that when he has achieved the secret of permanently reconciling them, he will live at a level of intensity

which those who remain in the unreal world cannot possibly know (59).

As the Rev. Harold C. Gardiner observes in *America*, "This brilliant, erratic, exasperating book cries out on almost every page for the presence of Christ." Why does Wilson reject Christianity and insist on a new religion?

This is the most important question we have to ask.

His rejection of Christianity is implicit. In treating the writings of George Fox he says (212), "Let us dismiss at once" the idea that he really took the Christian dogma seriously. Wilson belongs to a generation for which faith has been spoiled by rationalism, an age that would *like* to believe but cannot make the "preliminary gesture of faith" (120).[1] "The Outsider must . . . start from grounds all can understand and accept" (93); therefore St. Augustine's *Credo ut intelligam* is impossible (199-200).

But what kind of religion will do? Are we to throw over Western civilization and accept the Eastern way? No, Wilson is too much of an Existentialist for that. We must rather "come to terms with the complexity of [our] civilization, and . . . form [our] solutions upon that basis" (Wilson, "Where Do We Go From Here?" *The Reporter*, Nov. 15, p. 36).

He is now working out the details of the new religion which will save civilization. Here especially it is very hard to follow his confused thought. "A religion is nothing more than a concept of the purpose of life" (*Ibid.*, p. 35). He agrees with Blake in throwing out moral specifics such as the Ten Commandments (*Outsider*, p. 227). One reason he dislikes Christianity is that he seems to misunderstand it as "a religion of Talmudic law and dogma" (153). Yet in another place (280) dogma becomes of the first importance.

If any religious strain can be detected it is love of God (273), contemplation, "depth of imaginative ecstasy" (260) in the Oriental tradition.

Wilson also misunderstands the Christian doctrines of Incarnation and Atonement. And here we come, finally, to the core of his problem, causing a hopeless contradiction in his own thinking and a rejection of Christianity.

Repeatedly he attacks the humanist position. "Humanism denies that there are problems . . . beyond human solution" (243); Wilson says there are. "The most irritating of the human lice is the humanist with his puffed-up pride in Reason" (196).

Yet the very basis of Wilson's rejection of *Credo ut intelligam* is pride in his own reason. The Outsider, he says, must "learn to work out his own salvation. . . . There is a final enemy . . . who *cannot be fought vicariously*" (italics mine). There can be no "Atonement" (210).

1. Compare another book of 1956, strangely similar in motif to *The Outsider:* Charles Morris, *Paths of Life: Preface to a World Religion* (New York: George Braziller, Inc.). Morris, a professor of philosophy at the University of Chicago, is, like Wilson, strongly influenced by Oriental thought. Writing for "men and women who 'cannot go home again' to any of the religions, the philosophies, the forms of society which have yet been evolved" (9), he, like Wilson, rejects Christianity right from the start.

Clearly the "work out your own salvation" of Philippians 2: 12 and the "atonement" of many other passages *can* be reconciled; but the reason stumbles at this paradox, and all the strength of contemplative Will in the world cannot keep Wilson from proceeding to reject whatever he cannot understand.

Interestingly, despite this rejection he finds it impossible to avoid using Christian terminology — words such as "Original Sin" (for which his definition is certainly an unorthodox one — see above), "Fall," "Atonement," "life more abundant." In so doing, he has a good deal of company among contemporary writers. It is as if the modern age grasped certain truths by some kind of insight, struggled to express them, and discovered that it could not improve on the terms used by Christian writers who had *grasped the same truths long ago.* Wilson asks (116):

> Is it — is it thinkable that certain Christian saints were concerned about the same metaphysical problems that Sartre has produced, with the air of a conjurer flourishing a rabbit, as the latest development of twentieth-century thought?

The Outsider contains much true analysis, and is of course valuable for this reason.

It falls far short simply because the only possible solution is rejected *a priori* even before the start. But as a distillation of modern thought, it can easily serve as Exhibit A for those who would become acquainted with the way the intellectual of 1957 operates.

It is an important book, and should be read.

— *Charles A. Huttar*

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

What Presbyterians Believe, by Gordon H. Clark. Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1956. xi + 130 pp. $2.00.

Dr. Gordon Clark is Professor of Philosophy and Head of the Department at Butler University in Indianapolis. His philosophical writings are well known and deservedly so. This is the first theological publication from his hand, as far as the reviewer knows.

What Dr. Clark has given us is not a technical study as much as a practical handbook which can serve as a springboard into the more complex levels of theology. The present book (paper cover) is based on a series of popular articles on the Westminster Confession. They first appeared in the winter of 1954-1955 in *The Southern Presbyterian Journal.* In book form a second section has been added to each chapter so that it "might serve the purposes of study classes and discussion groups. . . . Even so, it is still not a formal commentary" (v). Clark sends

forth his study to the end that it may contribute to a fuller knowledge of God's Word—a sign in itself, when achieved, of the very presence of spiritual awakening.

The text consists of thirty short chapters covering articles on the Confession; three introductory sections precede the exposition and an appendix follows. The lack of an index does not seem to be a serious omission. For those particularly interested in the implications of Clark's position for a philosophy of religion, the introductory and concluding sections are in some ways the most relevant. After an introductory chapter by Dr. John R. Richardson, Pastor of the Westminster Presbyterian Church of Atlanta, Georgia, in which certain spiritual and intellectual high points of the Westminster Assembly of 1643 are given, Clark begins his subject by stressing the necessity of an informed ministry and laity; in the final introductory section he deals with the relevance of creeds for the consistent Christian: "The creed summarizes the most important Biblical teachings, and these must receive the emphasis" (4). The appendix consists of an address delivered in 1955 at the invitation of *The Southern Presbyterian Journal.* While emphasizing the importance and contemporaniety of the Westminster Confession, he also stresses the primacy of the intellect for the Christian in his acceptance of the *objective* truth of the Scripture (cf. Clark's articles on the subject: "On the Primacy of the Intellect," *Westminster Theological Journal,* May 1943; "Faith and Reason," *Christianity Today,* February 18 and March 4, 1957).

The volume is, as are all of Clark's writings, filled with penetrating and discerning insights, and though of the highest intellectual integrity, effectively humorous in a scholarly way. One example will have to suffice. In discussing marriage and divorce, he says of Princess Margaret, "If she could have married and snubbed the principle of establishment at the same time" (92). It is unfortunate to note, however, if memory serves the reviewer correctly, that the very Southern Presbyterians to whom Clark's writings were originally addressed, shortly after their publication returned to the non-Scriptural views on divorce held by the established church.

—*Lloyd F. Dean*

Dictionary of Anthropology, by Charles Winick. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. 579 pp. $10.00.

Anthropology, the science of man, extends to such far-reaching boundaries that it is nearly impossible to delineate very rigidly. Zoology, theology, sociology, criminology, and aesthetics are just a few of the vast areas into which the octopus-like arms of this science reach.

From the immense panorama of anthropological research there have come many specialized area studies in the forms of dictionaries, textbooks, and theses on the problems of the field; but unique in this study is the attempt to condense the tremendous scope of field vocabulary to a mere 10,000 entries. This has been the accomplishment of Charles Winick in the present volume.

Taking into account the fact that the vocabulary of the field is always expanding as well as the scope of meaning of many words so that precise definitions are very difficult to maintain, he has done a superb job of choosing words which are important to a conversational interest and a comprehensive understanding of great portions of this huge field. He has selected only the choice words and the key personalities in order to supply a compact one-volume dictionary-commentary for student use.

As a beginner's source guide this book is most valuable; but for concentrated study it is lacking in three essential points:

1. Heavily over-balanced with definitions from the area of physical anthropology, it fails to achieve a real balance of the field, due to the compiler's personal interests.

2. The book is not detailed enough in definition. What is stated is clear enough but too much sacrifice is made for brevity's sake. Particularly we note a lack of connective elements in the definitions that would tie them together so as to provide the reader with an understanding of the unity of the whole field. This is, of course, an ideal and this lack would be found in any dictionary. Nevertheless, it is a lack and it should be mentioned. Some of the short definitions are, however, very fine and precise and we do not mean to make a sweeping criticism of Dr. Winick that would be blind to his obvious scholarship.

A standard phonetic guide for pronunciation would also have proved a very important asset to beginners in the field.

3. Far more dangerous than the words of a definition, which often appear quite harmless, is the meaning which is conveyed by the definition. This meaning is, of course, colored, formed and organized by the basic philosophy of life espoused by the man who establishes the definition. Dr. Winick's view of Christianity seems to be the perspective of an observer, looking upon one more of the many religions of the world. To him there is no unique factor in Christianity, no contact with God through His son, Jesus the Christ. He thus does not write as one who has experienced Christianity. Hence the Christian student of anthropology should exercise due caution in this respect, but he can well use this dictionary to some understanding of an important field.

—Charles Davis

The Geography of the Bible, by Denis Baly. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957. xiv and 303 pp. Illustrated. $4.95.

There are two basic approaches to the study of the Holy Land in relation to Biblical history. The first is that of the recent *Bible Atlas* by Emil Kraeling which is primarily historical and the second is that of George Adam Smith's classic *Historical Geography of the Holy Land* which stresses the geography. Baly's volume falls in the latter tradition, where the reviewer predicts it will for some time be the definitive work.

But to place emphasis upon the physical environment in history, and particularly Biblical history, is to place oneself squarely in the tension between geopolitical determinism and supernatural guidance. Baly faces this polarity sharply. He tells us that while the theologians may not be interested in geography nor geographers in theology, "it is impossible to understand . . . a country without some knowledge of the structure and of the mechanism of the climate, and on the other hand, to attempt to study the Bible as if it were merely a work of secular history is to do violence to its nature." The land "is a complex and powerful thing, strongly influencing the lives and thinking of its people," and the Book "presupposes the existence of one God who is both active and effective" (xii). He feels the land is a chosen land, chosen by God for His revelation and conditioning the mode and symbol in which it is progressively given.

To the end that Baly may illustrate this thesis "that the geography of Palestine was no less part of God's plan for His people than the history" (77), a thorough discussion is given the geological past, the physiography, and the climate of the area. The influences of these on settlement and trade, on warfare and food supply are alloted many fascinating pages. Thus, while as a trained geographer who has been for many years a student of the area, the factual material, pictures, and charts on the above points are the educating work of an expert, it is his faith in his thesis that provides stimulation and incentive to the reader. For example, great care is taken to anticipate such problems as whether the climate or landscape has changed within historical times and, if it did, just what effect this may have had on the inhabitants of the area. This provides for some confidence in his evaluation of historical conditions and hence in the interpretation of Biblical speech figures and of various accounts of physical and climatological occurrences. But it also allows the writer to plead that God has used such effects for the unfolding of Himself, not incidentally, but as part of an eternal design culminating in the entrance of God into history in the Person of His Son.

In these unfoldings Baly is sometimes rather vague or oversimplified as to interpretation. For example, we are told that since "the desert of

Arabia has been the cradle of the great monotheistic religions . . . it was therefore necessary to the purposes of God that the Israelites should begin their education in the desert in order that they might enter Palestine with the concept of one God already implanted in them" (77) and that "when the Israelites came into the country of Palestine it was taken for granted that Yahweh . . . was a storm God with his home in the mountains of Edom. . . . The lesson which the people had to learn . . . was that God . . . was not to be regarded as confined to these wilder activities of nature, but was the master of all His creation" (80f.). Surely even from the side of physical environment this is too simple. Too, there are many difficulties with such an idea on any high view of the Pentateuch where much earlier monotheism is revealed. Yet there are many problems for those who forget the elements of truth therein. Revelation and its vicissitudes is undoubtedly vaster than many of the concepts of the interpreter of the left or the right, and a book such as this, while forgetting at times both sides of what it desires to teach, will surely aid in clarifying and improving a portion of this thorny problem.

The volume is amply indexed and footnoted, even containing a glossary of geological terms. In addition, there is a very fine bibliography and a complete index to the *one thousand* Biblical references. No minister, Bible student, exegetical scholar, or even Holy Land traveller should neglect this aid. It is the informed and lucid conversation of a teacher moving with ease through the complex stuff that is Biblical history.

—*Thomas H. Leith*

Prescription for Anxiety, by Leslie D. Weatherhead. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1956. 157 pp. $2.50.

This new work, by one of the more prolific of the 'minister psychologists' of our time, will be of interest to those who desire a fresh stimulation to positive thinking. Anxiety, a conflict situation "which cannot be resolved by appropriate action" (16), haunts the experience of man. In some persons it is such a crippling condition that psychiatric referral is necessary, but for the most, religious orientation, in which the 'will-of-God heresy' ("that cruel and horrible diseases . . . are the will of God" [46]) and a false picture of God (as a fierce, denunciatory preacher, or an angry potentate) are eliminated, will suffice to make life worth living. This latter state will further depend upon daily emphasis on the fact of God's unconditioned love and the many stabilizing promises of the Bible.

Two points should be made in reference to Weatherhead's 'prescription.' First, that it is inadequate to cure the real condition of anxiety—sin. The deep, crippling condition of sin is, rather, ignored, and spiritual

regeneration is a superficial psychological weaning from parents derive from the improper exegesis of John 3: 5! (27) "Being saved" is findin one's "home" which is "that state of mind in which we find the complet satisfaction of our highest selves" (80). Secondly, the foregoing inade quacy should not cause one to react from the sanctifying grace and emo tional therapy that may be received from reviewing the great promises o God and 'the renewing of the mind' in them. Christians certainly wi profit from the positive thinking on Biblical premises. It is possible tha many will find stimulation to better mental health through the practica suggestions found in this volume.

—*Donald F. Tweedie*

The Pattern of Authority, by Bernard Ramm. Grand Rapids: Wm. E Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1957. 117 pp. $1.50.

This treatise is made up of two parts in the main: (1) A presenta tion of the conservative view of the pattern of religious authority as issuin from God and embodied in the inspired Scriptures, which are authenticate by the Holy Spirit. (2) A statement and critique of four main type of unsatisfactory views of religious authority, namely those of Roma Catholicism, of religious modernism, of the Kerygmatic school, and o Neo-Orthodoxy.

One should not, on account of the short compass of this book, b under the impression that it is a superficial summary carried out on entirel familiar lines of thought. On the contrary, the author here comes t grips with some of the most far-reaching issues confronting the evan gelical scholar, and he advances a number of very fruitful considerations The bibliography and the footnotes (happily located at the bottom o the relevant pages) are clear indication of the serious documentation an careful study which are at the basis of this volume.

Naturally, in an area as wide and as difficult as the one covered b this work, it would be expecting too much to anticipate complete agree ment at every point between the author and any reviewer. In fact, ther are minor points on which the present reviewer would probably beg t differ with Dr. Ramm or express himself otherwise. Nevertheless in th main, one cannot but emphasize that we have here a concise and com petent presentation of the conservative position, executed with considerabl skill and clarity.

Now, on account of certain positions espoused in Ramm's *A Chris tian View of Science and Scripture,* some people have been inclined t question the genuineness of his conservative stand. The present volume

with its wholehearted support of the authority and veracity of Scripture, ought certainly to dispel any misgiving on this score.

This work is the second in a new series called "Pathway Books" designed to present in a brief compass and at low price the main features of the evangelical position on controverted issues or in fields in which significant advance has been made of late. The firm of Wm. B. Eerdmans is to be congratulated on this new venture on behalf of the conservative faith. — *Roger Nicole*

The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought, by John Baillie. Columbia University Press, 1956. 151 pp. $3.00.

[Two of our reviewers submitted analyses of this book. Since two different approaches are used and there is some disagreement in the evaluation, both reviews are printed. — Ed.]

A special kind of grace must be given to those who can do secondary work supremely well. And John Baillie has a double portion of it. For in *The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought,* though he breaks no new ground and is concerned rather to review thoughts advanced by others, the resulting book is a creative unity which could very well stand by itself as an introduction to the whole subject of revelation. It was time for someone to summarize and bring into a single perspective the recent advances made in the Church's understanding of the revelation by which it lives. It is hard to imagine that anyone could have done it more completely than John Baillie.

The opening chapter sketches rapidly the development of the concept of revelation in the centuries following the breakdown of scholasticism. The chapters that follow discuss various aspects of revelation which have loomed large in the contemporary theological conversation. To list these: Chapter II insists on the subtlety of the divine self-disclosure as subject-to-subject; that is, God himself, and not objective information about God, is what is communicated in true revelation. This chapter draws heavily on Barth and uses Austin Farrer's Bampton Lectures with some criticism. Chapter III speaks of the significance to the depths of human life that God has spoken. The main debt here is to Tillich. Chapter IV discusses revelation as primarily act in sacred history — or the interaction of event and interpretation — rather than as proposition. There is a large debt here to William Temple, but the Biblical emphasis on the "mighty acts of God" is the common property of modern theologians. In chapter V the subject is the crucial place of the human response as part of the revealing action. Brunner's influence dominates the chapter, but there are bits of

Buber, Temple, Farmer, that great seminal mind, F. D. Maurice, and a sur prising long citation of the old Puritan divine, John Flavel, to indicat that modern insights stand in an "experimental" tradition. Chapter V deals with the place in revelation of the witness of Holy Scripture and th faith community. Father Thornton is both used and criticized; Dodc Temple and Maurice are drawn upon. An epilogue deals with the mora claim that comes with the recognition of the Word of God. No one i so much in evidence in this final emphasis as is author Baillie and hi own profoundly Biblical insights.

The quotations are well selected. They represent accurately the dis tinctive contributions of the great minds that have pressed this discussion forward in the past half century. Dr. Baillie's comments are judicious For example, he qualifies the over-enthusiastic analogy between the metho of grace in the Incarnation of the divine in sinless, though limited man hood and the method of grace in the inspiration of the Spirit in men wh are imperfect of their own kind — a valuable clarification of a common but too-facile analogy. And through the whole book, Dr. Baillie is maste of his materials.

Dr. Baillie has made what he humbly calls "an extended review" o the modern discussion of revelation. He has, of course, not attempted systematic treatise on his subject; he has concentrated on those areas o thought in which the past two generations have made their most significan advances. These advances — the closer definition of the historical an the personal — are worth such attention, for they mark an epoch; the have carried the discussion of revelation to a level where the "objectivity subjectivity" antithesis is transcended. The terms within which we move ar not what they once were. The horizon is less confining. The continuin discussion, as Dr. Baillie explains it, is trying to let the positive realit of the Biblical revelation speak for itself by clearing away sub-Biblica ways of conceiving it. For someone who may wish to join this discus sion, here is an able and concise summary of what has been said thus fa

— Daniel B. Stevick

In this expansion of his Bampton Lectures at Columbia University th venerable principal of New College, Edinburgh has sketched the dominan complex of theses advanced in the contemporary concern with the locu of revelation. Manifesting his wonted thoroughness, analytic clarity, an adept summarizing he leads us along the main paths of what by no amounts to a formidable maze of literature on the subject. Perhaps no livin English-speaking theologian comes more qualified to the subtle task o epitomizing than Dr. Baillie, whose catholic taste in theology derives fro

ears of dialogue with both American and Continental thinkers. He has ompressed his knowledge here gracefully. His documentation and quotaions are select.

To condense Baillie's summary to the very bone: The history of rotestant thought discloses a gradual transformation in the understanding f revelation from revelation as infallibly defined dogma about God (the ntellectualist view, inherited from the Middle Ages) to revelation as the mmediate, self-disclosure of God to the individual as subject to subject, in harp contrast to information about God. This emergent view also refuses simply to identify" revelation with the Holy Scriptures. There are imortant nuances separating current thinkers in the way of stating the relaion between Bible and revelation, but, as Baillie abundantly illustrates, all gree that the Bible is more response than revelation, strictly speaking.

And yet it is claimed stoutly that response is integral to revelation. eception and interpretation crown the event as revelation, lest the divine n the event remain hidden entirely. However, no finite interpretation an infallibly enshrine the revelational act. Hence, any doctrine of "uniorm" or "verbal" inspiration concerning the language of the Bible appears ven more obsolete than at the close of the nineteenth century. By this quivalence of finitude with fallibility, contemporary theology in the main relieved of the onus of defending the reliability of the Biblical witness s, e.g., history. Such a question is to be settled by purely historical and iterary research and is, at best, only peripheral to the concern about enounter with God.

It is not unfair to point out that the "I-Thou" personalism of the ullberg-Ebner-Buber tradition controls this new concept of revelation; it is nly to repeat what is acknowledged all around. But one must object when is philosophy of religion is identified with the Biblical view, as Baillie ttempts to do in Chapter VI. And it is a compounded blunder to set is "Biblical" personalism over against the so-called "static" intellectualism f orthodoxy — Protestant and Romish. Rome, no doubt, can speak for self, but let us merely point out that even the experimental Puritans, like lavel, whom Baillie unstintingly praises, never felt this sharp antithesis etween Scripture as inspired and infallible language and true fellowship ith God. Indeed, Puritan piety is shaped by Puritan exegesis of the Bible hich presupposes that its words are the very words of God. A deficient nguistic theory inadvertently led them to some grotesque speculations about ome aspects of the discussion of the Bible as inspired, but Baillie and others o not mention these mere superficialities.

A more correct (though still inadequate) representation of the hisoric Protestant view of revelation than we are given in this book might be

summarily put thus: All the mighty revelational acts of God — miracle theophany, *and* divinely controlled interpretation of these events — constitute revelation. Since we know primarily through reason and sense God has left an inscripturated deposit, clear in fundamentals and sufficient for men to know reconciliation with God and how to walk with God. It discloses God to us, that we might know Him well — as a child knows its Father. Language does not *per se* erect a barrier between God's revelation and man; it *is* the God-breathed medium, in the case of Scripture, of knowing God. It is therefore properly to be called the Word of God. Just what revelation "says" may be sometimes a problem to saints who look therein to God, but this has been *the* enigma in contemporary theology.

The new thought is not put off easily, however. Baillie's book manifests its value for evangelical thinking in crystallizing neatly the basic structure of this crucial idea, so as to challenge conservatism. A lively, creative orthodoxy will not content itself by merely lopping off a few stock errors but will speak to the new view in terms consistent with its axial belief and yet thoroughly relevant to the present "situation" in theology. The paucity of able voices ready to champion the historic view of revelation in such a way is all too apparent in the absence of any contemporary orthodox names in Baillie's bibliography.

—*Thomas Grady Spires*

Second Thoughts on the Dead Sea Scrolls, by F. F. Bruce. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1956. 144 pp. $2.50.

For those who have been confused by the deluge of books, articles, newspaper reports and references concerning the Dead Sea Scrolls, Dr. Bruce's book will be a welcome relief. *Second Thoughts on the Dead Sea Scrolls* might well be considered a digest and sequel to Millar Burrows' excellent book, *The Dead Sea Scrolls.* This is not so detailed and extensive as the earlier book, but in clear and simple language it tells the basic facts concerning the discovery and nature of the scrolls.

It is in the last half of the book that Bruce makes his greatest contribution. Here, from an evangelical scholar whose learning and judgment is of the highest calibre, is an explicit evaluation of the scrolls and their relation to the Bible and Christianity. In a chapter on the scrolls and the Old Testament he concludes that "in general the new discoveries have increased our respect for the Massoretic Text" (69). Some of the most interesting chapters are those in which he seeks to identify the Teacher of Righteousness, the Wicked Priest and the Covenanters themselves. Like most moderate scholars he dates the beginning of the group in the

ime of Alexander Janneus, about 100 B.C. He even suggests that that vil priest-king might be the Wicked Priest of the scrolls.

In regard to the nature of the community, both the likenesses to and ifferences from the Essenes are noted, and the tentative judgment is assed that they might well be one of several Essene-like groups. As to ne relation of the group to Christianity, Bruce follows Burrows in making ery clear that the sect of Qumran was far more unlike than like Chris- anity. The possibility that there may have been some contact between)umran and John the Baptist, however, is not ruled out. He makes the iggestion that there may be a real tie between Qumran and the Ebionites f early Christianity.

So fast do new finds and literature come forth that as Dr. Bruce con- udes, "It certainly looks as if we must prepare ourselves for Further houghts on the Dead Sea Scrolls." We can only hope that in a few ears this thought becomes a reality and we shall have another volume s helpful as this on an absorbing topic. —*Philip C. Johnson*

aul Before the Areopagus and Other New Testament Studies, by N. B. Stonehouse. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1957. 197 pp. $3.50.

There are, in all, seven studies in this book. The first, from which ne book is named (Paul's "Areopagus Address"), was the Tyndale New estament Lecture for 1949, delivered at the Divinity School, Cambridge, ngland. Four of the other articles ("Who Crucified Jesus?", "Repentance, aptism and the Gift of the Holy Spirit," "Rudolf Bultmann's Jesus," Martin Dibelius and the Relation of History and Faith") have appeared rom time to time in the *Westminster Theological Journal;* the study on The Elders and the Living-Beings in the Apocalypse" was contributed to a *estschrift* for Dr. Grosheide of Amsterdam and the short paper "Luther nd the New Testament Canon" was delivered before the Evangelical heological Society meeting in Chicago in 1953.

The book is definitely recommended because of its careful, competent andling of the word of God. The author combines, in a happy fashion, a ide and critical knowledge of the literature concerned, with a reverence or the text of Scripture. He also has an eye for interesting and relevant etail without pedantry. And furthermore, the discussion is timely and elevant, even though a few of the papers were composed some time ago.

Since it was the reviewer's privilege to sit in the classroom when the uthor discussed many of these problems, the terrain was familiar in several laces. Yet he found himself reading page for page and word for word, ecause the years which have elapsed since that experience have made

the observations and conclusions reached in these studies more significant than ever.

In closing, attention is especially called to the treatment of the problem of an *Anknupfungspunkt* with the thought and life of the non-Christian world, as reflected in Paul's address before the Areopagus (pp. 25-31); and to the discussion of *Formgeschichte* (pp. 121f.). This latter is a splendidly lucid analysis of the subject in brief compass, and — best of all — in English. — *Paul K. Jewett*

T. S. Eliot's Poetry and Plays, A Study in Sources and Meaning, by Grover Smith, Jr. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956. 338 pp. $6.00.

Here is an excellent addition to the growing number of volumes of critical and analytical work on modern poetry and on T. S. Eliot in particular. It represents an immense amount of knowledge, not only of Eliot's writings, sources, and meanings, but also of Eliot's critics as well.

The book, happily, avoids the pitfall of merely rehashing all the previous analyses of these poems and plays; Professor Smith has, instead, built upon and added to studies already made, and has, furthermore, cast light upon some of the passages which have obstinately remained obscure until now. The chapter on *The Family Reunion* provides just such an instance, for serious students have been as much puzzled as intrigued by this play in the past.

In his preface to the book, Professor Smith writes, "It considers in particular the creative ideas behind each work and the literary echoes which enrich meaning; Eliot has always been a poet of the savored word, the historic connotation." The plan of the book carries out this intention. The poems have been taken in order (for the most part) and through an examination of them chronologically and as a unified development of Eliot's thought, the recurring themes which unfold in his writing have been lucidly traced.

Chapter I, by way of introduction, clearly sets forth a thesis which long has been implied, but not often explicitly stated — that of the romantic heritage under which Eliot is writing. A characteristic burden of blight and guilt which plagues Eliot's seldom heroic heroes, the world out of chime, every soul insulated against every other soul, reinforcing the romantic theme of isolation in guilt, a lonely, dejected hero in an "idealist's quest for union with the vision forever elusive in this world" — these are the themes which Professor Smith calls the romantic residuum of Eliot's poetry.

He does not, however, ignore other important themes in Eliot's poetry and plays. The poet's sensitivity to the past and the present, and to the past as a present reality, is brought out in the study. So too is the theme of love, of redemption, and of "the great debate between the spirit and the flesh . . . the idealist crushed alike by the ineffectuality of his idealism and by the feebleness of his capacity for the real" (54). Professor Smith includes along with these a discussion of the motifs and patterns which Eliot's conversion to Christianity has impressed upon his work.

The author has undertaken an evaluation of Eliot's work as he proceeds through the book. He recognizes the strongly personal element which, though often masked, is present in the poetry and drama. He neither raves over nor condemns Eliot, but evaluates his work with a great deal of sympathy and common sense which is both refreshing and convincing.

The force of this study is to uncover still more of the complex richness of both the poetry and drama. According to its stated purpose in the preface, the book does not show the relation of Eliot's prose to his poetry, and yet it does, even if not explicitly, show the relation and unity of theme in all of his writing — in his critical essays, his book reviews, and his minor poems, as well as in the major works. And perhaps one of the most important parts of the whole book will be the excellent and extensive notes and references, and the well annotated index which close the book. Undoubtedly this will be necessary reading for the student of modern literature. — *Ann Dorothea Ferguson*

The Intellectual Development of John Milton: The Institution to 1625: From the Beginnings through Grammar School, by Harris Francis Fletcher. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1956. 469 pp. $7.50.

One of the leading Milton scholars in the United States has recently added to his own broad and solid bibliography this first volume of a projected two-volume study of the intellectual development of John Milton.

The purpose of this study was to see "all the books and other materials that Milton used or could have used in his formal education" (ii). This mass of material could then be seen as the most important factor in the genesis of the ideas of the great seventeenth-century Puritan poet. It is recognized that there were many variables affecting the development of Milton's mind which are beyond complete recapturing (personalities of teachers and friends, chance conversations, sermons heard, etc.), but surely the books that he read and studied must have contributed the greatest influence to his intellectual growth.

Numerous studies have been published on Milton's use of, influence by, or mere awareness of scores of works ancient, medieval, and contemporary; but no attempt has been previously made to bring these studies into perspective with a systematic investigation of his whole career. The great David Masson, whose monumental nineteenth-century study of Milton is the basic modern reference to the poet's life and times, attempted in some measure to do this; but the major emphasis of Masson is upon living personalities rather than upon books. Probably because no major work of scholarship is ever entirely superseded, Fletcher is sensitive to the fact that he must seem to be "rewriting Masson," but this he disavows. He would have been more convincing if he had not felt compelled to survey Milton's entire life, including his ancestry, and then to put him in his proper setting in connection with the educational processes to which he was subjected. As a result, the reader will probably feel that there is often much flailing for a very little grain.

The present volume will amply illustrate that the kind of education which Milton probably received was a Christian education, but not narrowly considered. The weight thrown upon literature and language (Milton knew Latin, Greek, Hebrew, Italian, Spanish, and French *before* going to college), together with the emphasis placed upon music and mathematics, was calculated to produce a Christian humanist. Such an education was provided through private tutors and in a London preparatory school because Milton's father could afford it. Milton became sufficiently satisfied with his early training by the time he had reached middle age because his own tractate *Of Education* substantially outlines the same features: education is to "repair the ruins of our first parents," and it is designed to make the boy skilful in all the arts of war and peace.

The chief weakness of Fletcher's work, over and above the tendency to prolixity, is stylistic. He is frequently excessive. He describes Milton as "the most learned man known to the Western World" in his day (74). Surely, as Professor W. R. Parker has shown in *Milton's Contemporary Reputation,* the greatest danger one faces in seeking the bubble of another's reputation is not the cannon's mouth but the mouth of the idolater. The same tendency appears in passages where Fletcher presents "new" facts or evaluations: the tone of crowing is immodest. One ought not to be in competition with anyone but himself when pursuing scholarship.

Perhaps this is only to say *hominibus impossibile.* The major conclusions of Professor Fletcher seem to me to exhibit good judgment. His work will undoubtedly long be referred to as a companion piece to that of his equally esteemed colleague T. W. Baldwin, *William Shakspear's Small Latine & Lesse Greeke.* —*Ralph E. Hone*

SURVEY OF SIGNIFICANT ARTICLES

THOMAS H. LEITH

American Journal of Sociology, February. A. J. Mayer and S. Marx, "Social Change, Religion and Birth Rates." The March issue has an article on inspirational religious literature.

American Scientist of March has articles on extrasensory perception by R. A. McConnell and by I. R. Hafstad on "Science, Technology and Society."

Anglican Theological Review, January. J. M. Kitagawa, "Theology and the Science of Religion."

Atlantic, March. L. Kirstein, "Future of American Opera." In April B. Ruml writes "Pay and the Professor."

Behavioral Science, January. A symposium on Freud.

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. In February T. R. Miles writes "On the Difference Between Men and Machines" and D. J. O'Connor discusses "Determinism and Predictability."

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March. Lee DuBridge, "Science — the Endless Adventure." January has two articles on science and religion.

Christian Scholar, March. J. M. Peet, "Commission and Obedience in Christian Education."

Church History, March. R. P. Beaver, "Nationalism and Missions."

Concordia Theological Monthly. February has an article on religion in public schools.

Confluence, Winter. A very fine issue continuing the discussion of "Woodrow Wilson and the Problems of Liberalism."

Dublin Review, Summer. An issue on education in a changing world. In the Winter number there is a discussion of the whole problem of crime and punishment.

Eternity, March. Donald G. Barnhouse writes "We are One Body in Christ."

Ethics, January. B. J. Diggs, "Ethics and Experimental Theories of Motivation and Learning."

Etudes Philosophiques, October-December. A very fine issue on the history, doctrine, philosophy, and application of psychoanalysis.

Free University Quarterly, January. N. H. Ridderbos, "The Meaning of Genesis One."

Hibbert Journal, January. C. B. Armstrong, "Christianity and History"; J. G. Griffiths, "The Vatican Excavations and the Tomb of St. Peter"; and P. R. Boyle, "Dilemmas of Christian Marriage."

Iris, January. Articles on the need for and the standards of Christian writing and Martyn Lloyd-Jones on "The Authority of Jesus Christ." In March E. J. Young discusses the accuracy of Genesis and in April Lloyd-Jones writes "The Authority of Scripture."

Humanist, Nos. 1 and 2, 1957. J. Muller on "Man's Place in Living Nature."

International Affairs, January. B. K. Blount, "Science as a Factor in International Relations."

Interpretation in January has an article by W. H. Boggs on "Faith Healing Cults."

Journal of the American Scientific Affiliation. R. H. Bube writes on "The Relevance of the Quantum Principle of Complementarity to Apparent Basic Paradoxes in Christian Theology" in December.

Journal of Biblical Literature in March has J. P. Hyatt, "The Dead Sea Discoveries, Retrospect and Challenge."

Journal of Higher Education, January. T. D. Lockwood, "History and the Humanities."

Journal of Religion, January. A series on Kierkegaard.

Main Currents in Modern Thought, January. Henry Margenau, "The Meaning and Faith of Science" and R. R. Delgado, "Analysis of Some of the Historical Trends Toward Integration of Nations in Our Time."

Nation, January 26. A. A. Rogow, "Low Standards For Teachers." David Cort writes on book clubs on February 16.

National Education Association Research Bulletin, December. A whole issue on state and sectarian education.

New Republic, February 25. Articles on Chinese communism and on "Who Are the Intellectuals?" On March 4 Arthur Bestor discusses the education of the gifted child, and on March 18 letters between Freud and Einstein probe "Why Do Men Fight?"

Partisan Review, Winter. A series on "The Crisis in Communism" and H. Arendt on "History and Immortality."

Pastoral Psychology, March. Peter Bertocci and W. G. Cole, "Is an Existentialist Christian Approach to Sex Necessary?"

Philosophical Quarterly, January. W. H. Walsh, "The Autonomy of Ethics."

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, December. Peter Bertocci, "The Person as the Key Metaphysical Principle."

Philosophy of Science, January. H. Freistadt, "Dialectical Materialism."

Political Science Quarterly, March. G. Catlin, "Political Theory: What Is It?"

Presbyterian Guardian, January 15. R. K. Churchill, "Genuine and Counterfeit Faith Healing."

Quarterly Journal of Speech, December. D. C. Bryant, "Whither the Humanities?"

Reformed Journal, January. T. P. Dirkse, "The Age of Science." In February Jesse De Boer writes "Philosophy and Theology."

Reformed Review, January. A series on the present situation in Biblical theology. Also L. L. Ponstein, "Ordination of Women."

Religious Education, March-April. A symposium, "The Family and Religion," and H. H. Punke, "Religion in American Public Schools."

Reporter, March 7. Reinhold Niebuhr, "The U.N. Is Not a World Government."

Review of Metaphysics, March. H. Veatch, "Tillich's Distinction Between Metaphysics and Theology."

Review of Religion, March. R. Tsunoda, "Reflection on Buddhism and Its Problems."

Saturday Review, March 30. J. Ciardi, "The Morality of Poetry."

Science has a committee report on the social aspects of science on January 25, articles on the structure of physical science and on units and concepts of biology on March 8, and "Teleology and Theory of Human Behavior" and "Scientific Outlook: Its Sickness and Cure" by MacLeod and Polanyi respectively on March 15.

Science and Society, Winter. B. J. Stern, "Some Aspects of Historical Materialism" and I. L. Horowitz, "Bertrand Russell on War and Peace."

Science Newsletter, March 15. Admiral H. Rickover, "The Talented Mind."

Scientific American, April. Harrison Brown, "The Age of the Solar System."

Scientific Monthly of February has E. Jones, "Nature of Genius" and W. A. Fowler, "Formation of the Elements." In March D. N. Michael writes a thought-provoking article on the need for attracting more high school students to science careers. C. S. Blinderman writes "Thomas Henry Huxley" and Edwin Boring writes "When Is Human Behavior Predetermined?" in April.

Teachers College Record, January. R. F. Butts, "States' Rights and Education"; G. Z. Bereday, "Selective Education vs. Education For All"; and G. Austin, "Freedom, Conformity, and Uniformity." In March Marc Belth writes "Education in the Universe of Whitehead."

Theology, January. Several articles on recent liturgical and Biblical trends in Catholicism. In February we have R. P. Casey, "A Russian Orthodox View of New Testament Textual Criticism."

U. S. News and World Report, March 15. V. Dabney, "Integration." On February 15 there is a discussion on the limits of a judge in punishing a citizen for contempt of court.

Victoria Institute has papers this spring by Michael Foster on "Contemporary British Philosophy and Christian Belief" and by Douglas Spanner on "Science and Christian Apologetic."

World Dominion, January. L. Steiner, "The Pentecostal Movement," and H. L. Ellison, "Religious Trends in the State of Israel."